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ABSTRACT
This study is a rhetorical analysis of Richard Nixon’s early-career anti-communist
conspiracy rhetoric. In conspiracy scholarship, two tracks have emerged: the paranoid style and
the political style of conspiracy. Nixon, though, as a tricky rhetor, does not fall neatly within
either of those styles, instead he samples from both styles over time and even within single
speeches. After synthesizing the two styles into a method, I analyze three early Nixon anticommunist conspiracy texts between 1946-1962 which span those years and cover various
genres. Text one is Nixon’s “Maiden Speech” to the House of Representatives in 1947. It is
mostly in the paranoid style of conspiracy. Text two is the 1960 presidential campaign pamphlet
“The Meaning of Communism to Americans,” which is mostly political. The third text is the first
chapter of Nixon’s 1962 memoir Six Crises – the chapter is titled “The Hiss Case.” This text
constructs the communist conspiracy fully within the paranoid style while simultaneously
creating a “liberalist” conspirator fully in the political style. Due to Nixon’s fluidity between
rhetorical styles, I introduce the concept of pragmatic agency to account for his conspiracistic
rhetoric, which falls between the political and paranoid.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1
“If you want to make beautiful music, you must
play the black and the white notes together.”
– Richard M. Nixon

Nearly forty years after his resignation, Richard Millhouse Nixon, the 37th President of
the United States of America, is still regularly discussed in American media and pop culture.
Although much of the discussion of Nixon revolves around the Watergate scandal that ended his
presidency, Nixon’s complex personality and long political career solidified him in our collective
conscience as an iconic, but fractious figure. Movies in the past two decades have alternately
portrayed Nixon in disparate fashions: as a paranoid, alcoholic, and on the edge of sanity (Oliver
Stone’s Nixon, 1995); a scheming buffoon and a victim of circumstance (Andrew Fleming’s
Dick, 1999); or a recent portrayal, adapted from a hit British play, of a stubborn but apologetic
Nixon admitting to the American people he made mistakes throughout the Watergate
investigation (Ron Howard’s Frost/Nixon, 2008).
Iconic photographs from Nixon’s career, as well as gestures and phrases associated with
him, remain in the public lexicon. The phrases “I’m not a crook” and “what did you know and
when did you know it” are repeated ad nauseum, while adding “-gate” to the end of every
political scandal (and sports scandal) is a media trend.1 He is tritely mimicked through homage to
his double peace sign and thumbs up, while Nixon’s negative physical aspects (jowls, sweaty
upper lip, five-o’clock shadow, pointy nose and deep set features) are characterized by
cartoonists and remembered by political analysts during the debate cycle in every election years.2
On the other hand there is another, positive, legacy of Nixon remembrance. In the large
photographic archive there are other enduring pictures of Nixon with his family, with Dwight
Andrew Malcolm, “Watergate, the hotel, has a Bidgate after Foreclosuregate,” Los Angeles Times,
7/21/2009.
2
John Self, “The First Debate over the Debates: How Kennedy and Nixon Negotiated the 1960
Presidential Debates. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 35, (2005): 361-63.
1

2

Eisenhower, and debating Khrushchev – promoting him as a faithful husband and father, liked by
Ike, and an ardent anti-communism, respectively. To round out the photos, there are some which
remind us of President Nixon’s major foreign policy successes. Not only did his foreign policy
maneuvers catapult Nixon to re-election over challenger George McGovern in 1972 by the
largest margin of victory by any Republican President ever, but the discourses originating from
photos of Nixon shaking hands with Mao and Brezhnev remind us that Nixon “opened China”
and “made peace” with the Soviets.
Especially Nixon’s work with China is remembered. Whereas Reagan gets much of the
credit for ending the Soviet ‘threat,’ an opera commemorates Nixon’s trip to China. This piece,
“Nixon in China,” is the only opera based upon a president, and has had a long run. It premiered
in the mid-1980s, and has continued to play and be recorded in various cities and countries
around the world (although, ironically, it has not yet premiered in China). The opera has grown
in popularity in the past decade – and therefore, Nixon has made in-roads not just in Hollywood
and pop-culture, but also in “high culture.”
If not multiplicitous enough, public memory of Nixon increased in polysemy through his
post-presidential authorship. After resigning, Nixon authored nine books, mostly on foreign
affairs,3 and began the revisionary work on his disgraced public image. Then in his final living
act, the Nixon drama took an ironic turn. Although the other presidents succeeding Nixon
spurned his advice and what they saw as his foreign policy meddling (his trips abroad and his
professorial books), Democratic President Bill Clinton brought Nixon back into the presidential
fold on matters of foreign policy, especially in regards to the new Russian Republic and the other
former Soviet Bloc states. In this symbiotic friendship, the former Governor of Arkansas got a
Ronald Lee, “The Featuring of the Will in History: A Rhetorical Exploration of Richard Nixon’s PostPresidential Writings,” Quarterly Journal of Speech, 75, (1989): 453.
3
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much-needed foreign policy tutorial, and a fallen President finally achieved elder-statesman
status. The men became close just in time, because Nixon died within the term, and sitting
President Clinton gave Nixon’s eulogy in 1994.4 Thus, Nixon rehabilitated his image as much as
possible.
More than these multiple public memories of Nixon and his continued cultural cachet,
though, his pragmatism and conspiracism make his rhetoric a fascinating artifact. I am not the
first to regard Nixon and his rhetoric as an apt case for rhetorical criticism. Although much
scholarship in the field, like our culture as a whole, primarily focuses on Nixon’s presidency, and
when scholars use his early career, it is usually done as a means to explain his presidential
failure, post hoc. Rhetoricians such as Edwin Black, Roderick Hart, Lee Sigelman and historian
William Chafe have all explored Nixon’s “dual personality” – or his strange desire for privacy
despite pursuing the most-public of careers. All of these authors (save for Black) primarily focus
on this privacy becoming secrecy and paranoia in Nixon’s Presidency.5 Black does study
Nixon’s upbringing, family, and faith, but focuses solely on Nixon’s campaign literature while
further promoting the public man/private man distinction.6 Other communication scholars, such
as Mark Feldstein, Ronald Lee, John Self, Thomas Goodnight, John Poulakos and historian Kim
McQuid have focused on press coverage of Nixon, as well as his image management through
mass media. This set of articles also focuses mainly on Watergate and the aftermath of Nixon’s
resignation, with the exception of scholastic discussion on the 1960 Nixon-JFK debate. Finally,
several rhetoricians, such as L. W. Rosenfield, Edwin Black, and historian Eric Foner have

Thomas Rosenstiel, “Richard Nixon: 1913-1994: Clinton plays an ironic role for Nixon funeral,” Los
Angeles Times, 4/25/1994.
5
Lee Sigelman, “The Presentation of Self in Presidential Life: Onstage and Backstage With Johnson and
Nixon.” Political Communication 18, no. 1 (2001): 1-3.
6
Edwin Black, “Richard Nixon and the Privacy of Public Discourse.” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 2, no. 1
(1999): 1-2.
4
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studied two famous early-career Nixon texts: the “Checkers” speech and the “Kitchen Debate”
with Nikita Khrushchev. The former has been studied in terms of apologia, though, and the latter
in terms of feminist critique, centering on Nixon’s reference to American women as
“housewives.”
Before previewing my work, however, two of the aforementioned articles must be
discussed in more detail due to their treatments of pragmatism and conspiracy. The first, by
Roderick Hart, deals with pragmatism, and also purports the usefulness of biography in
rhetorical criticism.7 The article uses Nixon’s biography primarily to further the dual personality
thesis, however, and only briefly includes “pragmatism” in a list of four other predominant
Nixon personality traits.8 Where Hart’s article focusses much more on those other personality
traits, my study purposefully examines biography to emphasis the notion that Nixon’s
(rhetorical) pragmatism was ingrained from childhood.
The second article I must expound upon is the co-authored piece by Goodnight and
Poulakos. Despite the intriguing fact that the article’s title9 includes two of my major concepts –
conspiracy and pragmatism – the article does vastly different work than this study. First, the
article only considers conspiracy from the inherently-negative paranoid style – a style that I show
in my “Method Chapter” has been problematized in a subsequent stream of conspiracy
scholarship (the political style). Second, this article only looks to Nixon’s late career and pits his
credibility against the credibility of the Washington Post journalists, Woodward and Bernstein,
who scooped the Watergate scandal. Third, this article uses an outdated form of criticism in the
field: fantasy theme. Lastly “pragmatism” and “fantasy” are used in this article as a conceptual
Roderick Hart, “Absolutism and Situation: Prolegomena to a Rhetorical Biography of Richard M.
Nixon,” Communication Monographs 43 (1976): 204-28.
8
Hart, “Absolutism and Situation,” 204-06.
9
G. Thomas Goodnight & John Poulakos, “Conspiracy Rhetoric: From Pragmatism to Fantasy in Public
Discourse,” Western Journal of Speech Communication 45 (1981): 299-316.
7
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binary to weigh the credibility of Nixon against the journalists. The authors argue Nixon’s
“pragmatism” waned as his side of the Watergate story became increasingly fantastic to the
public. In contrast, the journalists’ “pragmatism” waxed as their account became more publically
believable and moved away from its early status as a fantastic conspiracy theory about the
President. However, I dispute this article’s fundamental premise, that pragmatism is defined as
being necessarily not-fantastic, and the resulting claim that the two terms are in an opposite and
inverse correlative relationship. Studying Nixon texts, I argue nearly the opposite – that
pragmatism is a mode of agency for Nixon to make alternating political and paranoid claims
even within one text. Some of his claims are factual and some are fantastic, and that rhetorically
demonstrates Nixon’s pragmatism.
The aim of this study is to cover Nixon’s early career and anti-communist conspiracy
rhetoric. To do so I analyze three Nixon texts from 1946-1962, and pose possible implications
for conspiracy theory. My implications, through future research, could very likely illuminate
Nixon’s paranoid presidential behavior and his eventual downfall, but that period falls outside
the limits of this study. Therefore, I start at the beginning and look forward, in contrast to the
many scholars who have started with Watergate and looked backward.
In his early life and political career I take an interest in Nixon’s home-life, his father’s
Methodism and his mother’s Quakerism, as well as his debate, acting and poker playing
experiences. These and other factors, I argue, shaped his pragmatic personality. I am also
interested in the development of his issue of expertise, free-market capitalism, and how that
affected his anti-communist conspiracy rhetoric. This study also looks at Nixon’s use of religious
terminology and his rhetorical variations on the theme of scapegoating – depending on whether
he is scapegoating individual communist agents or scapegoating the broader ideology of

6

communism. Furthermore, I research whether Nixon uses different rhetorical strategies in texts
depending on his purpose in denouncing communism domestically or internationally. Finally, I
also investigate Nixon’s complicated friendship with Joseph McCarthy, and how their different
rhetorical strategies likely led to McCarthy’s political exile and Nixon’s political ascendency.
By studying Nixon’s rhetoric, I do not intend to prove that Nixon believed in a
communist conspiracy (which the texts prove at face value), but instead, make a practical as well
as theoretical contribution to the study of political rhetoric. First I synthesize a method of
criticism out of existing conspiracy scholarship. Then, I focus on the agency of Nixon’s anticommunist conspiracy rhetoric in that rhetorical criticism, arguing for the theoretical inclusion of
pragmatism in order to account for Nixon’s complex conspiracy rhetoric.
Many Nixon texts could be construed as somewhat conspiracistic. The three primary
texts I have selected, though, are highly conspiracistic, cover the entirety of Nixon’s early
political career (1946-1962), and derive from vastly different rhetorical situations. The first text,
“The Maiden Speech” was delivered by Nixon in the House of Representatives in 1947. This was
Nixon’s first (maiden) address to the House. It was an appeal from the House Un-American
Activities Committee (HUAC), delivered by committee-proxy Nixon, for the conviction of
“contempt of congress” by suspected-communist Gerhart Eisler. The second text is a pamphlet
from the 1960 presidential campaign titled “The Meaning of Communism to Americans.” The
third and last text comes from Nixon’s book Six Crises, and is the first chapter, titled “The Hiss
Case.” In this text, Nixon, newly out of public office, reminisces about his early public career,
tries to vindicate his communist conspiracism, and positions himself for future office.
In addition to Nixon, conspiracy theories have cultural cachet in America. Our republic
can trace its conspiracy discourse as far back as independence, and this discourse continues to

7

permeate our society today. The early rise of Freemasonry led many to believe the group’s
members were conspirators attempting to control the country. In reaction to perceived
conspiracies, oppositional groups of conspiracists – those who believe a conspiracy exists –
arose to expose those cabals. Among the most-notable conspiracist group are the Ku Klux Klan
and the John Birch Society (“Birchers”). Conspiracist groups have often been viewed as small
collectives of lunatics (such as the 9/11 “Truthers” and Obama “Birthers”). Yet, populist
conspiracist movements have influenced national politics in the past and present, and often have
spokespersons who are top-level politicians. Some of the most politically influential conspiracist
groups have been the anti-masons, apocalyptic Christians, anti-slave power Republicans, and
anti-communists. These mainstream conspiracist movements have all had famous leaders, and
perhaps became mainstream because of the support of such influential figures. Respectively
these movements were represented by former president John Quincy Adams (who wrote his
book Letter on Freemasonry, in 1833 – just five years removed from the presidency),10 Reverend
William Lloyd Garrison,11 senate candidate Abraham Lincoln,12 and a young Richard Nixon.
Conspiracy theories, furthermore, have not subsided in the media age. Although one may
assume increased access to information would waylay conspiracism, various media continues to
cover and even produce conspiracy fodder. Televisions shows such as The X Files and
Conspiracy Theory with Jesse Ventura, the book The Da Vinci Code, and movies such as “JFK”
and the “National Treasure” series are just a few examples of the proliferation of conspiracy
materials. Furthermore, the internet is rife with conspiracism. Now any radical or mild

10

Arthur Goldwag, The New Hate: A History of Fear and Loathing on the Populist Right. New York:
Pantheon Books, 2012, 173.
11
Michael Pfau, The Political Style of Conspiracy: Chase, Sumner, and Lincoln. East Lansing: Michigan
State University Press, 2005, 18-43.
12
David Zarefsky, “Conspiracy Arguments in the Lincoln-Douglas Debates,” Journal of the American
Forensic Association 21 (1984): 63-75.
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conspiracist group (such as neo-Nazis, a plethora of anti-government groups, or parents
concerned about vaccines) with the wherewithal to make a simple website, blog or Facebook
page can broadcast their views and biases to anyone who can conduct an internet search. It
appears conspiracism (belief in conspiracy) is as rampant as ever.
Scholarship has intermittently studied the concept of conspiracy. Historians and public
intellectuals, such as Hofstadter, Goldberg and Goldwag, have written tomes tracing major
conspiratorial and conspiracist groups throughout American history. Sociologists and
psychologists have researched the paranoia and fear which give rise to conspiracism. In the field
of rhetoric, scholars have studied the argumentation of conspiracists. Beginning with Kenneth
Burke, conspiracy arguments were described as rhetorical devices used by madmen such as
Adolf Hitler, whose “private mind translated into the vocabulary of nationalistic events.”13
According to Burke, whose textual analysis of Mien Kampf foretold much that would transpire
later, the mass appeal of Hitler’s conspiracism was his scapegoating of Jews. Scapegoating is a
process of placing blame on some innocent ‘other’ and exiling or sacrificing them, as the
“curative unification by a fictitious devil-function.”14 Often scapegoating and conspiracy go
hand-in-hand, because, “it may well be that people, in their human frailty, require an enemy as
well as a goal.”15 But while the field of rhetoric greatly expanded due to Burke’s other works, his
work on scapegoating and conspiracy was not emphasized for many years. As I describe in
Chapter 3, in the 1960s the paranoid style of conspiracy was finally taken up again and morefully theorized. More recently, as scholars study the works of mainstream conspiracist rhetors,

Kenneth Burke, “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s ‘Battle’,” in Philosophy of Literary Form, 3rd ed., California:
University of California Press, 1973, 210.
14
Burke, “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s ‘Battle’,” 218.
15
Burke, “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s ‘Battle’,” 219.
13
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such as early Republicans Abraham Lincoln, Salmon Chase and Charles Sumner,16 it became
obvious that not all conspiracists were on the fringe of society – as these three men were
prominent enough to found one of our two existing political parties. Therefore, theory
culminated in the political style of conspiracy, with its own evaluative criteria. This style more
adequately addresses the discourses of mainstream conspiracists.
The paranoid and political styles have been constructed as distinctly separate, however,
and are therefore restrictive to rhetors who do not neatly fit within one style or the other. As I
discuss in my analysis, Nixon does not fit well in either style, across years or even within single
speeches – sampling from both styles in whatever configuration a given situation necessitated.
By studying three of his mainstream, yet conspiratorial and complex rhetorical texts, I hope to
expose the insufficiency of this paranoid-political stylistic binary. Therefore I take up the
concept of “pragmatic agency”17 to study Nixon and his early-career rhetorical fluidity in order
to bridge the gulf between existing conspiracy styles.
Plan of Study:
This study first reviews Nixon’s early life, in order to establish the context for his
complex rhetoric and political ascendency. Therefore I situate, in the terms of Herbert Wichelns,
“The man, his work, [and] his times.”18 Chapter 2, “Background,” begins with a brief discussion
of Nixon’s formative years: family hardship, Quakerism, debate-teams, amateur acting, and
experiences in Duke Law School and the Navy. Next I provide an overview of each text’s
relevant contextual information, including the broad and immediate rhetorical situations of each

16

Pfau, The Political Style of Conspiracy, 47-152.
Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969,
128.
18
Herbert A. Wichelns, “The Literary Criticism of Oratory,” in Landmark Essays on American
Public Address, Davis, CA: Hermagoras Press, 1993, 3.
17
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text – specifically the exigency, audience, constraints.19 The context of “The Maiden Speech” in
early 1947 includes America’s Post-WWII mindset, the second Red Scare, Nixon’s first political
campaign victory in 1946 and his immediate appointment to HUAC. Between this first text and
the second primary text (the 1960 Presidential Campaign Pamphlet “The Meaning of
Communism to Americans”) Nixon gained national fame by prosecuting the Alger Hiss case in
1948, propelling him first to Senate election in 1950 before becoming Vice President on the
Eisenhower ticket in 1952. Interestingly, as McCarthyism ended and the Korean War began,
Nixon’s political cynicism increased, and his focus shifted from domestic communism to
international communism and the Cold War. Finally, in contextualizing this study’s third major
text (“The Hiss Case” chapter in Nixon’s 1962 book, Six Crises), I trace Nixon’s 1960
Presidential loss to John Kennedy, and the beginning of his “wilderness years” – between 1961
and 1968, during which time Nixon was out of public office. Thus, the rhetorical purpose of
Nixon’s book was that of a private citizen trying to protect the viability of his political future. In
this endeavor, Nixon wrote earnestly, trying to vindicate himself by offering proof for the anticommunist conspiracism he used early in his career.
Chapter 3, on “Method,” begins by situating conspiracy style within the broader
discussion of style within the field – both its classical and contemporary treatments. First I use
Aristotle and Cicero, demonstrating that style has been a major rhetorical concept since the
Hellenistic age, and one of the five “canons” of rhetoric since the Romans. Next the chapter
traces modern excavations of style, and its usefulness in politics both as decorum, and as a
collective aesthetic that can unite the people of an era. Situating style as such enables me to
segue into the existing styles of conspiracy scholarship – the paranoid style and the political style
19

Lloyd F. Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation." Philosophy & Rhetoric vol. 1, no. 1 (Winter 1968): 6-8.
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of conspiracy. These styles have been theorized as distinctive in their ideological framing, fear
appeals, and the four distinctive inner-textual evaluative criteria ascribed to each style. After
homing in on this gap between these two current styles of conspiracy, I situate Nixon’s
complicated conspiracy rhetoric. Since Nixon samples from both the paranoid and political style,
depending on the occasion, I introduce pragmatism and a focus on agency to the existing
scholarship in order to adequately account for Nixon’s combination of paranoid and political
elements in each text of analysis. In sum, I make a robust critique of the existing style binary,
and position Nixon as a conspiracist who uses pragmatism as a form of agency with which to
move between political and paranoid styles – not only from text to text, but within a single texts.
In Chapter 4, “Analysis,” I apply my synthesized, critical method to three Nixon anticommunist conspiracy texts. Through comparative textual analysis, this chapter demonstrates
that Nixon takes on a pragmatic, conspiracistic agency as he samples from both the political and
paranoid styles in each text. A cautionary note is warranted though: in none of these three texts
does Nixon ever solely use a political or paranoid style – he always, pragmatically, uses both.
The question becomes “to what degree?” does Nixon use each style in each text. Dependent on
the situation, the first text is mostly-paranoid in its conspiracism, the second is mostly-political,
and the third is fascinating because Nixon constructs two conspirators – one, the communist, is
constructed as wholly paranoid, while simultaneously Nixon introduces a second, “liberalist,”
conspirator, wholly in the political style of conspiracy. Over time, I argue, Nixon relies on
various configurations of ideology, fear appeal, and evaluative criteria from the paranoid and
political styles, and rhetorical proofs to pragmatically fit the decorum of his rhetorical situations.
The result of this pragmatic style of conspiracy rhetoric is Nixon’s increasing name recognition,
as he styled the anti-communist conspiracy rhetoric of his era.

12

Finally, in my concluding “Discussion,” I extrapolate implications from my analysis.
These implications form the basis of my recommendations for future research, which could
prompt and significantly inform further rhetorical criticism of Richard Nixon’s presidential
successes and the conspiracistic failure of Watergate, which led to his resignation. Future
research may well uncover other pragmatic conspiracists, and further theoretical developments in
conspiracy scholarship. Ideally, future research would be able to theoretically map an entirely
separate style of conspiracy rhetoric situated squarely between the political and the paranoid
styles – the pragmatic style of conspiracy.
The limitations of this study, however, do not extend to fully developing that new style,
as more case studies and evaluative criteria would be necessary. This study is limited to Nixon’s
antecedent, conspiracy rhetoric, as exemplified from 1946-1962. Furthermore, this study only
analyzes three primary Nixon conspiracy texts, although many more of his speeches within this
time frame may prove to be conspiracistic. The three selected texts are not only highly
conspiratorial, but involve different rhetorical situations which allows for perspective by
incongruity. Lastly, these three texts span the entire era of Nixon’s early public career. Although
these texts could be analyzed with other rhetorical methods, this study’s critical approach is from
synthesized conspiracy theory, adding the notion of pragmatic agency to account for Tricky
Dick’s rhetorical fluidity.

13

CHAPER TWO
BACKGROUND

14

Birth through WWII:
From birth, Richard Nixon was an interesting character in a colorful cast. Born in 1913,
the second of four sons, he was named after Richard the Lion-Hearted by his Quaker parents. His
family was the primary, formative influence on Nixon’s personality, work ethic, and pragmatic
political career. By sketching a characterization of his faith and family in this chapter, I explore
relevant biographical factors that led to the pragmatism and anti-communist conspiracism of
Nixon’s early career.
Nixon’s parents were opposites. His mother, Hannah, was the daughter of Quakers who
spoke the plain language (thee and thou). Although Hannah did not use the plain language of her
ancestors, she was serious, practical, soft-spoken, and sincere in all she did. Frank Nixon,
Richard’s father, was a gregarious Methodist who later converted to Quakerism when he met
Hannah. Frank was a good-natured dreamer but also a loud, argumentative man. He was also
politically active, but pragmatic in his approach – having been raised Democrat, voted
Progressive, and finally settled on Republican.20 Frank tried his hand at lemon farming in Yorba
Linda, California, but when the farm failed due to drought, he sold the land, moved the family
down the road to Whittier, and bought a grocery store the family ran until he and Hannah
retired.21
Primarily, Richard Nixon took after his mother. From boyhood, Nixon was serious, even
“gloomy.” He was a hard worker at the family store and studious at school, but he was also
aggressively argumentative and competitive. He lacked a true sense of humor – especially in
group settings – and although he was not loud like his father, he used words as weapons.

20

Steven Ambrose, Nixon: The Education of a Politician 1913-1962, New York: Simon and Schuster,
1987, 11-16.
21
PBS Home Video. Nixon, “The Presidents” series, WGBH Educational Foundation: Boston, 2008.
DVD, 170 min.
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Furthermore, he was distrusting of nearly everyone outside his family, and was incredibly
sensitive to criticism – although throughout his life he constantly gravitated to the most public of
offices and political positions which inherently invited criticism. Combine this with “his
excellent memory [which] helped him store up grievances.”22 As a result, Nixon was nearly
friendless throughout his life.
Nixon also acquired positive characteristics during his boyhood. In addition to having a
good work ethic, Nixon, like his father, was a dreamer, who believed he would one day escape
poverty and become a lawyer. Unlike Horace Greely’s call to “Go west young man,” Nixon
always dreamed of escaping his West coast, rural poverty for East coast, urban luxury. From his
mother’s Quaker values, Nixon learned to be fastidious, obedient, tolerant, and modest.
Moreover, as someone who was interpersonally shy yet publically confident, Nixon’s persona
can be encapsulated by the weekly Quaker “meeting,” in which typically-reserved parishioners
are encouraged to share before the congregation.23 These traits that emerged from “meeting”
would later be described as Nixon’s “dual personality,”24 or as disparate onstage/backstage
behavior.25
Even though Nixon primarily took after his mother in temperament, his father is
responsible for his political politics and penchant for pragmatic argument. The first training
Nixon received in debating was at the supper table. “Like Frank, he enjoyed [argument] for its
own sake.”26 Classmates in primary school remembered that he would ask hypothetical questions
(“Would it be wiser to marry a pretty girl or a smart girl?”), then argue each side in turn. One
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classmate recalled, “No matter what was discussed, he would take the opposite side just for the
sake of argument.”27 Therefore, from a very early age, Nixon had a penchant for pragmatic
debate, regardless of the issue or position.
The family-dinner debates led to a notable career on the Wittier High debate team. In this
forum Nixon even impressed his coach: “He was so good it kind of disturbed me. He had this
ability to kind of slide around an argument instead of meeting it head on, and he could take any
side of a debate.”28 Later these skills would help Nixon win election to the House of
Representatives against Jerry Voorhis29 and stand up to Nikita Khrushchev in Moscow during
the “Kitchen Debate.”30
Nixon’s other favorite high school activities were his public speaking class and his forays
into acting, where he learned to be a crowd pleaser. Even though he could not shake his stoicism,
he could well up with tears for an audience. Nixon later admitted to David Frost that he never
cried except in public.31 Upon high school graduation, Nixon put his debate and acting skills to
use when discussing his college decision. Although he was accepted to Harvard he could not
afford to leave Whittier. But no matter how disappointed he was, he denied any disappointment
whatsoever. From this point on “His ability to deny what others regarded as obvious became his
way of dealing with things beyond his control.”32 This is a clear harbinger of Nixon’s later
Watergate and impression management strategies.33
At Whittier College, a Quaker school, Nixon continued to be head of his class. Having
already, tragically lost two brothers, he tirelessly pushed himself to succeed – trying to be three
27
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sons in one for his parents. Although Nixon felt guilty for being alive while his brothers had
died, he also felt cheated by their deaths and by God.34 When added to his pragmatism, this
resentment led Nixon to question his Christian faith at a fundamental level. Being Nixon was not
deeply philosophical or principled, he treated a faith decision pragmatically, as he would a
competitive debate topic, eventually deciding to reject Christianity while at university. He never
returned to devout faith.35
While at Whittier College, Nixon became even more involved in debate. He still loved to
argue for argument’s sake, and saw debate as “a healthy antidote to certainty, and a good lesson
in seeing the other person’s point of view.”36 On most political issues Nixon held neutral
positions, however, on economic issues “He became a convinced free trader from his debates.”37
This helps to understand why Nixon was such a fervent anti-communist, and why he chose to
start his career speaking out against a communist conspiracy (“The Maiden Speech”). Later, at
Duke Law School, his pro-capitalist and anti-communist ethos led Nixon to view himself as a
conservative, while, due to his broader neutrality, his Southern, conservative classmates viewed
Nixon as a classic liberal.38
After graduating law school, Nixon worked briefly as a California lawyer, and married
Pat – a fellow actor in a local play. However, after Pearl Harbor, Nixon’s career trajectory
changed. “As a birthright Quaker, he was entitled to an exemption from service. As a potential
politician, however, he certainly knew that it would be disastrous to his ambitions if he did
nothing to help win the war.”39 Therefore, Nixon networked with Duke alums and landed a
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wartime job in the Office of Price Administration (OPA). At OPA Nixon both saw the inner
workings of Washington D.C. and became indignant at the size of the bureaucracy and number
of New Deal progressives he saw doing harm to free enterprise.40 Moreover, Nixon was so bored
at the OPA that the former Quaker soon requested active Navy duty. Upon entering the Navy,
Nixon was more conservative and capitalist than ever, while pragmatic/political ambition
dictated his every career move.
Although Nixon did not achieve the heroics of a John Kennedy, he did rise through the
Navy ranks, eventually becoming a commanding officer. Two things were notable in Nixon’s
Navy tenure, however. First, he excelled as a poker player. Not only did this make him a lot of
money, but also his calculated style and patient tactics allowed him to wait for the perfect
moment to bluff.41 This ability to be timely and tell bald face lies would later be crucial in the
Voorhis debates. Secondly, to pass the time on ships and naval bases, Nixon read and re-read the
Bible, continuously.42 Although this may have been familiar and comforting for a former Quaker
far from home, this practice is a puzzling form of ritualized pragmatism for someone who had
analytically chosen to no longer be a Christian. Perhaps Nixon enjoyed pragmatically
juxtaposing his former and current beliefs.
First Election & Freshman Congressman:
When WWII ended, Nixon was discharged from the Navy and mounted a run in 1946 for
the office of U.S. Representative from California. His formidable opponent was Democratic
incumbent Jerry Voorhis, who was popular among constituents. Nixon was unknown, but the
Republicans had momentum in their domestic and international policy.
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Internationally the uneasy alliance which existed between WWII allies had disintegrated.
While the USA and USSR could work together against a common Nazi enemy, once that enemy
was gone the allies turned on one another, and “communism replaced the Nazis and Japanese as
the number one threat to the American way of life.”43 Combined with alarm about the atomic
bomb, its new level of destruction, and its possible proliferation, American fears mushroomed
into what would later be called the Second Red Scare, or the Red Hunt.
Domestically, 1946 was a terrible year. With price controls lifted from commodities,
inflation skyrocketed to its highest point in the century. Although it was hoped that ending food
rationing would stabilize the food supply, progress was slow and a large black market arose.
While inflation drove prices up, wages had been stagnant since 1942. As a result, 1946 saw the
largest number of labor disputes and union strikes in the century. Thus, internationally and
domestically, current events spelled disaster for the Democrats, who had controlled the
Executive and Legislative branches for an unprecedented sixteen years.44
Republicans made the most of the opportunity, encouraging voters to take out their
frustrations on the Democrats, who according to Republicans were advocating “socialism at
home and surrender abroad.”45 This slogan effectively conflated the New Deal with socialism,
and socialism with communism. Nixon used this tactic to beat Voorhis. The primary momentum
shift in the election came in the first debate, when Nixon associated two PACs who endorsed
Voorhis with the communist party. When Voorhis asked Nixon for proof,
Nixon grabbed a piece of paper, held it dramatically aloft, and began striding across the
stage toward Voorhis. He was simultaneously Richard the actor, the debater, the
courtroom lawyer, the clean-cut Quaker kid seething with righteous indignation, … [and]
the poker player who could bet more than a year’s salary on a bluff.46
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The performance “surprised and befuddled”47 Voorhis, who never recovered.
As 1947 started, Nixon and the Republicans assumed their new role as majority in the
House of Representatives, and they sought to avenge sixteen years of Democratic rule. One way
Republicans attacked Democrats, especially the current administration of Harry Truman, was
through HUAC investigations. Nixon was able to secure an appointment to this high-profile
committee (and the Labor Committee), since the Republicans had so many freshman members in
Congress. Therefore, “Nixon had a point position on the two most important issues on the
Republican agenda, curbing the unions and rooting out the subversives.”48 Eventually, it was his
involvement in HUAC, exposing communists in the Truman Administration, that gained Nixon
national recognition.
First Text: The “Maiden Speech” and its Rhetorical Situation
These historical events constituted the rhetorical situation of Representative Nixon’s
“Maiden Speech” to the House. The speech was primarily a HUAC committee report on the
testimony of Gerhart Eisler, who was alleged to be the chief liaison between the Communist
Party-USA and the Kremlin. The exigency leading to Nixon’s speech was vast. The post-war
domestic unrest and international fear of communism and atomic proliferation, outlined above,
contributed to the speech’s broad exigency. But the immediate, or controlling, exigency of the
speech was centered in the new Republican majority in Congress, and its perceived mandate
from the American public to right the New Deal’s wrongs, especially the creeping communist
conspiracy it had not addressed.
The immediate audience for Nixon’s “Maiden Speech,” on 18 February 1947 was the
House of Representatives. Addressing an issue as volatile as a communist conspiracy, however,
47
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Nixon got significant press coverage, which constructed a broader, national audience for his
speech. Finally, the constraints of the speech were also significant. As an unknown freshman
congressman, Nixon lacked ethos. But as I discuss in the analysis chapter, Nixon’s pragmatism
and heavy reliance on pathos and logos overcame his lack of ethos, and the subsequent vote to
convict Gerhart Eisler of contempt of Congress was nearly unanimous. In sum, Nixon gave a
“deeply impressive” speech, according to Newsweek.49
Following his conviction, and before sentencing, Eisler fled to Poland by ship.
Considering this turn of events, even those skeptics who originally doubted the evidence or
thought Nixon too dogged, now supported the investigation. Vindicated, Nixon was appointed to
chair his first HUAC sub-committee just three days after the “Maiden Speech.”50 Following
their success and positive press, Nixon and the HUAC committee began further investigations,
culminating in the riveting Alger Hiss case. All in all, Nixon “could hardly have dreamed of a
better start”51 to public life.
Aftermath of “The Maiden Speech”
Nixon was interested in more issues than just “Red Hunting,” though, in contrast to his
conspiracistic successor Joseph McCarthy. Unlike McCarthy, Nixon was not wholly paranoid,
and did not see communist conspirators everywhere he looked. Taking cues from his success as a
poker player, Nixon did not go all in on every hand. Thus, when a bill outlawing the communist
party came before HUAC the month after the Eisler case, “From the outset, Nixon was openly
dubious about the wisdom of the proposed legislation.”52 Following his lead, the bill died in
committee. Nixon took a more pragmatic approach toward the American Communist Party (CP),
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co-authoring the Mundt-Nixon bill, which would not outlaw the CP, but instead require all
American communists to register as Party members.53 This bill also failed to pass.
Another particularly curious example of Nixon’s pragmatism while on HUAC involved
the famous Hollywood hearings. It was after all Nixon who first suggested the hearings, and
“unspoken in Nixon’s remarks, but always there, was the implication that the Jewish studio
owners and the Communist movie writers were involved in a conspiracy” to disseminate
communist propaganda in the movies.54 But once the hearings started, Nixon quickly identified
that the committee was outmatched by their Hollywood witnesses. When he saw who held the
better cards, Nixon folded his hand, and did not attend another session of the hearings.
This proved to be the right decision, as everyone who remained deeply involved with the
Hollywood hearings lost public support. Eventually though, when HUAC presented the findings
of the Hollywood hearings to the House, Nixon had to get re-involved with the case to protect his
committee’s legitimacy. Following an anti-Semitic digression by another committee member,
Nixon had the unenviable task of “saving face” thrust upon him. “Nixon began by apologizing to
the House for HUAC’s ‘tendency to indulge in emotionalism and to get off on collateral issues
which have nothing to do with the issue at hand’.”55 The implication of this account is that
without Nixon’s well-spoken, well-reasoned pragmatism, the HUAC committee quickly
devolved into a paranoid sideshow. Moreover, it seems as though while Nixon was willing to
directly attack individuals and construct them as perfected conspiratorial scapegoats (Eisler), he
was reticent to perfect the entire communist ideology into a conspiratorial scapegoat. This
pattern of scapegoating individuals instead of communism as a whole would reverse during the
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1950s, as a Republican administration took power and worldwide Soviet influence grew.
However, Nixon still refrained from perfecting the broad scapegoat of communism.
1948 to 1960:
THE HISS CASE:
As the 1948 election approached, both Democrats and Republicans played on America’s
fear of communism for their own gain. Democrats controlled the executive branch, and adhered
to the Truman Doctrine to fight communism abroad. Republicans controlled the legislature and
could instigate probes and investigations. This was strategic for conspiracists, such as Nixon,
who believed the executive branch was repressing files detailing cells of communist conspirators
within the administration.56 Thus, when highly-partisan Truman called a special session of
Congress in order to embarrass Republicans, the stage was set for the Alger Hiss Case.
Nixon’s star witness was ex-communist and current “Time Magazine” editor Whittaker
Chambers. “Chambers explained he had come forward to warn his country of the scope, strength,
and danger of the Communist conspiracy in the United States.”57 But what troubled Nixon most
was that although Chambers had twice before told the Justice Department his story (in ’43 and
’45), no major investigation had resulted. “To Nixon this inaction proved that either the Truman
Administration was criminally lax in its security procedures or was shot through with traitors.”58
Among the communists Chambers named, the major accusation was against Alger Hiss, who had
served in various sensitive capacities in the FDR’s State Department. Over the years, Hiss had
planned a UN conference in California, accompanied FDR to the Yalta Conference, and was
friends with many high-ranking Democrats, Republicans and Supreme Court Justices.59
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Two days after Chambers named him as a communist, Hiss, now the president of the
Carnegie Endowment, insisted on appearing before HUAC to deny the charges. This was
different from every other person Chambers named, all of whom had to be subpoenaed to appear,
and who pled the 5th throughout their hearings before fading out of the spotlight. Hiss on the
other hand requested to appear, answered questions, denied knowing Chambers or ever being a
communist; “Hiss’s performance before the Committee was as brilliant as Chambers’ had been
lackluster.”60 Afterwards, when all other members of HUAC were prepared to drop the Hiss
investigation, only Nixon, a “master bluffer and amateur actor himself,” knew Hiss was
bluffing.61 Furthermore, only Nixon perceived that Hiss had qualified all his answers, and that
the issue had shifted from one of communist affiliation to one of acquaintance: “Did Hiss know
Chambers or not?”
Nixon decided to pursue the case further, and began to visit Chambers’ home for
interviews. Although Nixon trusted Chambers’ story he neglected to ask if Chambers had any
material evidence that proved Hiss had spied by funneling State Department documents to the
Communist Party. However, at the end of Nixon’s last visit, on his way to the car, Chambers
mentioned that Mr. and Mrs. Hiss were Quakers. “Then suddenly Chambers snapped his fingers
and said, ‘Here’s something I should have recalled before. Mrs. Hiss used to use the plain
language in talking with Alger’.”62 Nixon, a former Quaker, knew only a bona fide friend of
Hiss’s would know such a detail. From that revelation onward, Nixon never doubted Hiss’s guilt,
even though he did not have the support of his party.
With new evidence, Nixon interviewed Hiss a second time. Shockingly, Hiss retraced his
steps and “declared that he had perhaps know Chambers after all, but under a different name” –
60
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George Crosley.63 Then, when Nixon arranged for the two to meet, Hiss positively identified
Chambers, even though in the first hearing Hiss stated he could not identify a picture of
Chambers. Thus, Hiss was charged with perjury. When Chambers produces stolen State
Department documents (the “Pumpkin Paper”) he had held for Hiss, the charge was increased to
treason for spying.64 After battling the Administration for control of this evidence, Nixon’s
investigation paid off as a grand jury indicted Hiss on two counts of perjury (as the statute of
limitations for espionage had expired).65
Nixon won the case, and stood in the spotlight alone. Although there was enough press
coverage to share, the fact that Republicans did not assist Nixon in the investigation meant he
was instantly famous. Moreover, Nixon had gone toe to toe with the Truman Administration, the
Democratic Party, and the whole executive branch (DOS and DOJ), while owing only a small
debt to the cooperation of J. Edgar Hoover. Finally, Nixon found “he thrived on crisis, actually
enjoyed it and did his best when he was under pressure.”66 This was a revelation for Nixon who
would later write a book titled Six Crises, in which the first chapter recalled the Hiss Case.
(Since the book was written in 1962, this chapter is chronologically the third major text of this
study.) “Overall, the Hiss case … made [Nixon] into a world figure with an unlimited future.”67

SENATOR NIXON & JOSEPH McCARTHY:
Although the Hiss case was a great success for Nixon, the result was that the House of
Representatives was now too small a stage. Since the Democrats took back the House majority in
late 1948, Nixon was merely a minority member. Although he remained on HUAC, “he was
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something of a moderating influence,”68 as he focused on the Senate contest of 1950. Thus,
unlike McCarthy, achieving the convictions of two communists did not make Nixon fanatical, or
paranoid regarding communism.
Unlike the common folklore around his 1950 Senate race against Helen Douglas, Nixon
was not the lone aggressor smearing the perfect reputation of a helpless woman. Douglas was a
formidable campaigner who emerged from a nasty Democratic primary, before instigating
attacks on Nixon’s “record, his proposals, and his character.”69 Nixon reciprocated, and although
he did not overtly attack her sex, he did make personal mention of her husband’s celebrity as an
actor. Nixon also insinuated that the couple was connected with communism. However, “He did
not say that she was a Communist… but he could count on it that many people would make the
connection for him.”70 As will be discussed in the method chapter, this argumentative technique
based on implication has been called a “conductive argument,” and is a hallmark of the political
style of conspiracy. Eventually, Nixon won the election by a landslide, and the lasting proof of
its mean-spiritedness survives in the candidates’ respective monikers: Helen “the Pink Lady”
Douglas, and “Tricky Dick” Nixon.
The two years Nixon spent in the Senate, ’51-’52, were typified by negativism and
cynicism throughout the chamber. But although Nixon was partisan and outspoken against
Truman’s policies, McCarthy displaced him as the anti-communist standard bearer. “McCarthy’s
charges were so extreme, his inability to back them up so obvious, that he made Nixon look like
a scholar and statesman in comparison.”71 Although Nixon still spoke against communism from
time to time, he had begun to denounce the advance of international communism, whereas
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McCarthy claimed he possessed a list of names of communists currently in the Administration
(McCarthy’s “Wheeling Speech,” 2/9/50). One fundamental difference separating the two was
that while McCarthy did not care about the future of his own party (the Republican Party), Nixon
began to function as party liaison – explaining liberal and conservative positions to various
Western and Eastern factions of the party and bridging the gap between moderates and the old
guard.72 Again Nixon eschewed extremism and instead used pragmatism as a way to leverage his
political career as party liaison.
One incident from this time exemplified McCarthy and Nixon’s differing tactics, if not
their diverging temperaments. The incident occurred at a dinner which both men attended along
with another guest, Drew Pearson – a journalist who had criticized McCarthy very harshly. With
Nixon observing, McCarthy and Pearson exchanged verbal barbs until the impulsive McCarthy
asked the Quaker, pacifist Pearson to step outside. Pearson refused, but as he later left the dinner,
McCarthy physically attacked him in the coatroom. McCarthy had already grabbed Pearson by
the neck and kneed him in the groin, when Nixon walked in on the fight. As McCarthy saw
Nixon he continued to slap Pearson at full force and said, “That one was for you, Dick.” Nixon
then stepped between the two men, saying, “Let a good Quaker stop this fight.”73 Thus, Nixon
literally stood between a pacifist Quaker and a paranoid conspiracist and performed pragmatism.
If Pearson represents the childhood faith Nixon had partially left, McCarthy represented the
extremes of anti-communism Nixon never fully imbibed.
But although Nixon and McCarthy were not in fact close friends or identical in their
conspiracism, publically they were seen as closely tied. Some viewed Nixon as “McCarthy in a
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white collar.”74 When Nixon was being vetted as a Vice Presidential nominee by Eisenhower’s
team in 1952, this public perception of closeness had to be addressed. This association put Nixon
“pretty much out of the Communist-hunting business” for the time being, while he “frequently
told McCarthy privately that he had to do more homework,” and to not make accusations after
Eisenhower was elected.75 McCarthy adhered to this agreement partially, but by 1954 he was
back to his old ways, and finally Vice President Nixon publically denounced McCarthy. After
the mid-term elections that year the Senate censored McCarthy and he was never again
politically significant.76 For this, Eisenhower praised Nixon, who “managed to take care of
McCarthy without splitting the party.”77

VICE PRESIDENT:
Candidate Eisenhower picked Nixon as a running mate in 1952 for a plethora of reasons:
as liaison Nixon was liked by all Republican factions, his youth offset Eisenhower’s ‘maturity,’
he secured California’s electoral votes, and had served with distinction in both the House and the
Senate.78 As Vice President from 1952-1960, Nixon gained extensive international relations
experience, particularly in communist countries. Therefore, “As Vice-President, Nixon stayed
away from domestic anti-communism as an issue, but he made international Communism his
number-one issue, a special area of expertise and experience.”79 Some of the trips on which
Nixon closely saw the workings of the communism system were to Southern Asia, Africa, South
America and the Soviet Union.
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The two most significant trips were to USSR and South America. In South America,
communism was gaining popularity and influence, and Nixon’s 1958 goodwill tour of the
continent almost met a tragic end. The trip got progressively more hostile, as riots in Peru and
Ecuador drew lots of press coverage, and demonstrations turned to near-riots. Finally in Caracas,
Venezuela, the crowd attacked with more than spit and pebbles; they barricaded the road and
swarmed Nixon’s car with pipes, small rocks and clubs. The windows were smashed, but the
driver finally maneuvered the VP to safety.80 Of course the trip, and especially the attack, was
great press coverage for Nixon back home, as he was portrayed as not backing down from a
fight. Not only did Caracas help Nixon’s 1960 presidential stock soar, but as J. Edgar Hoover put
it, “one very positive result of the South American trip was that it made anti-Communism
respectable again in the United States” after McCarthyism.81 Thus, Nixon had first laid the
groundwork for McCarthy, silenced McCarthy without splitting the party, and then rehabilitated
anti-communism, albeit internationally, in the wake of destructive McCarthyism.
International anti-communism was a platform on which Nixon could build, and he wasted
no time. On January 1, 1959 Nixon met privately with the new Cuban President, Fidel Castro.
Nixon tried to confront Castro about communism and implored him to hold free elections. The
meeting altered neither man’s perspective, but was respectful. In fact Nixon’s initial
recommendation to Eisenhower was to tentatively support Castro while steering him toward US
policies.82 Later, when Castro’s government eschewed American medaling and instead made an
alliance with the Soviet Union, Eisenhower suggested an invasion of Cuba by ex-patriot Cubans
living in the United States, and Nixon became the foremost supporter of the planned invasion.
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Later in 1959, after Secretary of State John Foster Dulles died, Nixon got the chance to
travel to the Soviet Union for the opening of an American cultural exhibit.83 This was Nixon’s
chance to meet Khrushchev and see the inner workings of the Kremlin. Throughout the trip a
feisty Khrushchev sparred with Nixon, the aggressive, debate-loving Quaker. The highlight of
the trip came when Nixon and Khrushchev toured the American cultural exhibit in Moscow.
Stopping in the display of a modern kitchen, the two men began debating the virtues of
capitalism and communism in what is now known as the “Kitchen Debate.” Although it got very
heated, and was “a disaster in terms of conventional diplomacy, Mr. Khrushchev was still
smiling at the end. He had an argument with another politician today and an audience to go with
it, and naturally this was a politician’s idea of fun.”84 Back home, Nixon’s popularity rose even
higher in the 1960 presidential projections.

1960 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN:
As Nixon sealed his party’s nomination for President in the summer of 1960, he
encountered some roadblocks. First, although Nixon was a loyal Vice President to Eisenhower,
and always put Ike’s agenda above his own, Eisenhower was always cagy about his support of
Nixon. In the campaign this meant Ike did not advocate strongly enough or often enough for
Nixon’s record or experience.85 Nor did Ike formally campaign for Nixon until only two weeks
before election day. Comparatively, “Give ‘em hell” Harry Truman had great fun campaigning
for John Kennedy, taking many spirited shots at Nixon and the Republicans.
Another constraint Nixon faced in his campaign was Eisenhower’s policies. Ike’s
isolationist and small government agenda was growing less and less popular with the public, yet
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Nixon had to publically support the President – even though, for example, Nixon wanted to raise
defense spending.86 Furthermore, Nixon had a hard time differentiating himself from Kennedy,
especially since they “had no difference at all on the perceived great issue of 1960, how to stop
Communist expansion into the free world.”87 The final constraint resulted from Nixon’s own
personality: his inability to fully trust anyone prohibited him from accepting any advice about
running his campaign. This led to three regrettable decisions. First of all, his handpicked vice
presidential running mate, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., became a drag on the ticket.88 Second, Nixon
made and upheld a time-consuming pledge to visit all fifty states at some point during his
campaign (at a time when campaigning started after Labor Day). Third, and strangely enough,
Tricky Dick’s campaign was far too nice.89 Although Nixon could have raised many personal
issues against John Kennedy (upbringing, family, Catholicism, etc.), he decided to run a positive
campaign that was “presidential” in tone. Nixon also urged Republican’s everywhere to avoid
the religion issue, and even when Protestant evangelist Billy Graham offered to write an op-ed
denouncing Kennedy’s Catholicism, Nixon refused.90
Second Text: “The Meaning of Communism to Americans,” and its Rhetorical Situation:
In August 1960, Nixon released the campaign pamphlet “The Meaning of Communism to
Americans.” This document is my study’s second major Nixon text against the communist
conspiracy. Although the broad context for this document encompasses much of the previouslyoutlined history, there were also immediate exigencies, audience and constraints constituting the
rhetorical situation of this text. Regarding exigency, although Soviet-Cuban relations were an
ongoing concern, the immediate catalyst for the pamphlet was Nixon’s confirmation at the
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Republican National Convention, and his need to move away from Eisenhower’s noninterventionist foreign policy. As one observer remarked, Nixon’s problem was that “He’s got to
stay close enough to Eisenhower to win the nomination, and far enough away to win the
election.”91 Eisenhower’s tenure was so peaceful that the American people had started to look for
a challenge to overcome, to prove that the US was stronger than the USSR. Nixon’s campaign
pamphlet strongly repositioned the Republican Party against international communism
immediately after he won the nomination. The second exigency for the pamphlet was the fact
that the public perceived Nixon and Kennedy’s positions on international communism to be the
same. Thus, with this lengthy, detailed pamphlet, so heavily reliant on logos, Nixon was trying to
distinguish himself from Kennedy. If holding the same position, Nixon could at least sound more
knowledgeable regarding communism.
The audience for the pamphlet on communism was the American public. This was one of
the most evenly split elections in American history, and the moderate, presidential-tone of the
pamphlet appealed to undecided voters in the middle. With more registered Democrats than
Republicans nationally, Nixon especially needed independent votes and cross-over votes to win.
Thus, his communist pamphlet fit into Nixon’s broader, genteel campaign by logically, even
pedantically, questioning international communism on ideological grounds.
One constraint Nixon faced in releasing his anti-communist pamphlet was that as the
Vice President he could not overtly criticize Eisenhower’s non-interventionist foreign policy,
even though he personally disagreed with much of it. Second, Nixon could not be too aggressive
or conspiracistic in this pamphlet, as the country was still wary of anything reminiscent of
McCarthyism. Therefore, this study considers whether this rhetorical situation constructed one of
Nixon’s most pragmatic works on the communist conspiracy.
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Aftermath of Communism pamphlet and 1960 election results:
When the votes were tallied John Kennedy won the 1960 election by the slimmest of
margins. In spite of Nixon’s positive (nice) campaign, the constraints of promoting
Administration policies he did not fully support, and his inability to connect genuinely with
voters, he got half the votes in 1960. Perhaps when he was out of office and had a chance to
ponder, Nixon decided he would revert to the more aggressive and dirty campaigning which had
won him seats in the House and Senate.
One incident from the JFK-Nixon debates is of note for its pragmatism. Many have
commented on the first televised debate, in which JFK’s rested, tan appearance contrasted
Nixon’s sweaty, exhausted appearance and led a majority of viewers to state Kennedy won, even
though radio listeners preferred Nixon.92 For my purposes, however, an instance from the fourth
debate is more useful. The day before the fourth debate, Kennedy publically advocated arming
an ex-patriot Cuban force to invade Cuba. Nixon was irate with JFK for jeopardizing the plan
that Nixon himself had helped conceptualize and had pushed behind the scenes for it to be
executed before the election to boost his poll numbers. But instead of detailing his involvement
with the covert operation, or leaving the issue alone, Nixon used the platform of the fourth
debate to adamantly argue against his actual position on the prospect of an ex-patriot invasion of
Cuba.93 This moment was the culmination of Nixon’s lifetime of pragmatism – debating himself
on the presidential stage.
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OUT OF OFFICE: NIXON AS LAWYER AND AUTHOR
Text three: The Rhetorical Situation of Six Crises, “The Hiss Case” chapter
After losing the presidential election, Nixon promised Pat he was done with politics. The
family moved back to California, and Nixon returned to practicing law. But in 1961 Nixon was
only forty-eight years old, and although he was making more money in legal fees and his
syndicated political column than he had ever earned as a politician, he never was driven by
money. Instead, something Thomas Dewey told him in 1952 was still echoing in his head:
“Make me a promise: don’t get fat, don’t lose your zeal, and you can be President someday.”94
Thus, Nixon decided to write a political memoir in 1961, which would let the Republican
establishment know his ongoing political zeal remained. Given the right opportunity, this zeal
would trump his promise to Pat.
The book, Six Crises, became a best seller, and displayed Nixon at his best. Starting with
“The Hiss Case” and ending with the 1960 election, the book also covered Caracas, Khrushchev,
Ike’s heart attack, and the fund crisis (Checkers Speech). “Overall, it reminded voters…that he
had vast experience in government, and that he could be a good loser.”95 A primary objective of
the book was to position Nixon for either a possible bid for 1962 California governor, or the
1964 presidential election.
This study focuses only on the first chapter of the book, titled “The Hiss Case.” That
chapter reminisces about the communist conspirator who made Nixon famous, and is much less
restrained in tone than his 1960 campaign pamphlet about communism. Regarding the rhetorical
situation, “As with any memoir, it [gave Nixon] an opportunity to put forward his own point of
view on his political career and, in some measure, achieve vindication”96 regarding his early
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career anti-communist conspiracism. Thus, the exigency for the text is Nixon’s 1960 presidential
loss, positioning for future political races, and his need for vindication. The audience for the
book was broadly the American public, but specifically the Republican establishment. If the
establishment kept Nixon in mind, he could have future political life, and to ensure this, “Nixon
sent out hundreds of autographed advance copies to prominent Republicans…throughout the
country.”97 The constraints of the text related to timing. Although he was positioning himself for
future political office, Nixon considered the ’62 California Governorship to be the wrong office
at the wrong time, since he knew little of and cared little for state politics. But Nixon also
calculated that neither he nor any Republican could beat Kennedy in 1964.98 Nixon had the time
and impetus to write, but if he waited too long, beyond those two elections, his memoir risked
being forgotten before his next campaign. Regardless of the timing of elections, however, Nixon
was out of politics and he was not constrained in his candor about the communist conspiracy –
especially Alger Hiss. Reminiscent of his “Maiden Speech,” Nixon is honest and aggressive as
he uses the chapter on “The Hiss Case” to re-establish political ethos.
In the aftermath of the Six Crises, Nixon did in fact run for the ’62 California
governorship, and lost to a popular incumbent. Two reasons Nixon ran were, first, if he won he’d
avoid the ’64 Republican nomination, and second, because pressure mounted within the
Republican party for a moderate candidate at a time when the California GOP was in danger of
being overrun by the conspiratorial John Birch Society.99 As such, Nixon was put forth as a
moderate, Republican foil, to these paranoid right-wing conspiracists.
In concluding this chapter, it has become apparent that Richard Nixon is a complex,
pragmatic rhetorical figure. From his humble, Quaker beginnings, to his meteoric rise as the
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second youngest Vice President, and defeat in his first presidential race, this study seeks to tackle
the over-arching issue of whether Nixon’s conspiracy rhetoric and pragmatic agency correlate
with the trajectory of his career. Nixon’s use of conspiracism was more successful than
McCarthyism or the Birchers’ brand of conspiracism, and this study investigates the rhetorical
strategies that enabled Nixon’s success. Drawing upon his experiences as a debater, actor, and
poker player, Nixon seems to have negotiated a pragmatic path through the ranks of government
and through the anti-communist conspiracism in the post-WWII/early Cold War era.
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In this study’s three primary texts Nixon denounces the communist conspiracy in various
ways. As discussed in Chapter Two, Nixon’s “Maiden Speech” of 1947, the 1960 campaign
pamphlet “The Meaning of Communism to Americans,” and his 1961 book chapter, “The Hiss
Case,” were crafted to fit different rhetorical situations. In analyzing these three conspiracist
texts, I primarily use a synthesized method of conspiracy evaluative criteria to critique how
paranoid or political Nixon’s conspiracist texts are. But before embarking on analyzing the texts,
I explain the perspective I use and the method of analysis drawn from it.
Two styles of conspiracy rhetoric have been theorized in the scholarship – the paranoid
and political styles. As I will later discuss at length, the paranoid style is used by conspiracists on
the fringe of society as a form of dissent, warning against all-powerful, allegedly evil, cabals.
The political style, in contrast, is used by mainstream rhetors who use conspiracism as a form of
political agency, often to build consensus and form party factions in coalitions. Political
conspiracists view conspirators as mistaken rather than evil, and defeat-able rather than allpowerful. Since these two styles have been positioned as distinctly separate, the stylistic binary
becomes restrictive to rhetors who do not neatly fit into one style or the other, such as Nixon.
Before critiquing the binary, however, we must fully understand existing conspiracy
styles. Thus, this chapter first accounts for “style” more generally and situates it in the field – as
style is a rich concept in both classical rhetoric and has recently been revived in contemporary
rhetorical theory. Then I describe in detail current conspiracy styles and their methods of
evaluative criteria. Lastly, in this chapter, I suggest the concept of pragmatic agency to account
for Tricky Dick’s ability to seamlessly bridge the gap between the political and paranoid stylistic
camps.

39

STYLE
Aristotle and Cicero
If you enroll in a public speaking course today, likely the first lecture you would hear
would include the “Five Canons” of public speaking theory. In addition to invention,
arrangement, memory and delivery, the fifth canon is style.100 Although these five canons were
formalized by the Roman rhetorician Cicero, they originated in Greek theory, specifically
Aristotle’s seminal work On Rhetoric. Aristotle, however, did not strictly delineate between style
and delivery, and as such, his definition of style is difficult to exact. His specific definition of
style as “to be clear”101 at first seems extremely inadequate. But upon further inquiry, one finds
Aristotle was more interested in the continuum of the “virtue of style” and its parameters than he
was in giving a specific, prescriptive definition of what style is and how a speaker can obtain it.
Therefore the two poles of excess that anchored Aristotle’s virtuous continuum of style were
“too banal” and “too dignified.”102 As long as the speaker was somewhere between these two
poles, the speaker’s style would likely be appropriate for and clearly understood by the audience.
Only later did the Romans divide Aristotle’s four canons into five and codify style as having four
aspects: appropriateness, clarity, ornament, and correctness.103
As evidenced by contemporary handbooks on public speaking, it is Cicero’s more
prescriptive conception of style as its own canon that has been preeminent throughout the
resurgence of rhetorical studies in the twentieth century. The result was that for much of the
twentieth century, Cicero’s restrictive account of style foreclosed the concept’s usefulness as a
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critical category. Late last century, though, Robert Hariman revived the canon with his seminal
book Political Style: The Artistry of Power.
Hariman
The need to revisit style was largely based in Hariman’s frustration that “Established
academic conceptions of style hardly prepare one to take seriously the aesthetic dimension of
political experience.”104 To begin his project, Hariman first archaeologically excavates
Aristotle’s conception of style as a more useful means than Cicero’s definition from which to
expand contemporary scholarship on the neglected canon. Although starting with definitions of
style as “an inventory of techniques of verbal composition” and “the aesthetic economies
available to speakers in particular situations,” Hariman also includes “the recognition that
discourse has to be appealing if it is to be effective.”105 This demonstrates that Hariman is
influenced, at least in part, by the Burkean expansion of rhetoric from just the available means of
persuasion in a given situation, to include the identification of speaker and audience. This
becomes clear in Hariman’s conclusion, in which he quotes from Burke’s Rhetoric of Motives:
“the critic nonetheless is oriented toward ‘a general body of identifications that owe their
convincingness much more to trivial repetition and dull daily reinforcement than to exceptional
rhetorical skill’.”106 Using this to guide his discussion on style, Hariman argues that part of the
identificatory work that needs to be done by the speaker is in his or her adaptation to the most
appropriate style – the one that stylizes the right language in the right way for present situation.
“In a word, our political experience is styled.”107 As such, much of Hariman’s book enumerates
four “master styles” (realist, courtly, republican, and bureaucratic), and how an actor may stylize
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his or her discourse to be effective in environments that operate in those master styles.108 The
author explains that of these four, only the realist style (which is the “common sense of modern
political theory”) and bureaucratic style (which constitutes hierarchy, as in “office culture”) are
modern.109 Next, the author posits that studying the pre-modern republican style (“a model of
oratorical virtuosity…in a parliamentary culture”) and courtly style (“centered on the body of the
sovereign, displaces speech with gestures, and culminates in immobility”) assist the critic in
understanding the crumbling of modernity into our post-modern world.110 In other words, premodern examples help make sense of contemporary events which are otherwise irrational and
inexplicable within a realist or bureaucratic stylistic purview.111
The number of existing and emerging styles is unknown, and if “Style becomes an
analytic category for understanding a social reality,” there may be a unique style to each social
reality. As such, there is “no doubt that there are other styles – for example, a revolutionary
style,”112 in addition to the paranoid and political styles of conspiracy.
After excavating Aristotle’s original continuum of the virtue of style, and expanding the
notion of stylistic appeal through Burkean identification, Hariman has made possible his major
contribution – joining with style the classical notion of decorum. Decorum is a useful concept
because it operates on two levels: “as a set of conventions and as a theory of conventions.”113
Unlike Cicero, and his four rules (virtues) of style, “‘decorum’ articulates not so much a set of
rules as a process of invention,” equipping speakers not only with savvy linguistic technique, but
also with the social knowledge “to discern, evaluate, and appropriate elements of artistry across a
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wide spectrum of human activity.”114 I argue that Richard Nixon’s conspiracy style was
successful because through adhering to the decorum of the situation, he was able to
pragmatically adapt his rhetoric to the constraints in each situation.
Vivian & Maffesoli
While Hariman outlines distinct master styles, a new conception of style was introduced
to the field by Bradford Vivian, which accounts for the changing aesthetic qualities of stylized
politics. To make his intervention, Vivian starts with French sociologist Michel Maffesoli’s
definition of style as the “crystallization of an epoch,” or the “collective expression of a cultural
moment ‘…which writes or orients the epoch’.”115 This definition of style, unlike ridged master
styles, is a “conception of style [that] encompasses the heterogeneity of cultural forms
irreducible to discrete analytic categories.”116 Whereas the number of situations and the number
of styles within Hariman’s framework may expand until collapsing under its own weight, with
Maffesoli’s redefinition of style, a critic is able to study a pragmatic actor, like Nixon, who
deftly employs “the overlapping of styles.”117 In my analysis I discuss whether Nixon’s rhetoric
in fact did orient his era. Moreover, was his hybrid use of paranoid and political conspiracism the
epitome of a style accounting for cultural heterogeneity – the unity that bound post-WWII
disunity within the Republican Party?118 Before answering these questions through analysis of
Nixon’s conspiracist texts, however, it is necessary to have a thorough understanding of the
existing paranoid and political styles of conspiracy and the theoretical roots of pragmatic agency.
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THE PARANOID STYLE
The foundational work on “paranoid style” was written in 1964 by political scientist
Richard Hofstadter. Although Hofstadter traces the paranoid style back to the country’s founding
and a suspicion of the Illuminati and the Masons, he noted a recent proliferation of right-wing
paranoia, “ultra-conservatism,” and fringe politics. Although the book discusses the Second Red
Scare, McCarthyism, the John Birch Society, and Barry Goldwater119 at length, surprisingly, it
does not focus on Nixon’s conspiracy rhetoric, even though he and Hofstadter were
contemporaries. This may be an indication that Nixon’s antecedent conspiracism was not fully
paranoid or not yet recognized as such. Although traces of a paranoid style in rhetorical theory
can be detected in Burke’s work on Hitler and scapegoating,120 it was Hofstadter who named the
style and gave it its first full theoretical treatment.
The hallmark features of the paranoid style in Hofstadter’s theory included pedantry –
“the almost touching concern with factuality.”121 This pedantic nature amasses huge quantities
of, often trivial, details, and weaves each bit into an over-arching narrative that explains
everything. This means that paranoia appears coherent “– in fact the paranoid mind is far more
coherent than the real world.”122 The amassing of ‘evidence’ however does not prove the
conspiracistic conclusion of a paranoid narrative, so the paranoid conspiracist necessarily makes
a “paranoid leap” from their disparate facts to a fantastic conclusion.123 These fantastic
conclusions enable paranoid conspiracists to perceive cabals as all-encompassing: “The paranoid
spokesman sees the fate of conspiracy in apocalyptic terms – he traffics in the birth and death of
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whole worlds, whole political orders, whole systems of human values.”124 Since the fate of the
world is threatened by perceived all-encompassing cabals, the paranoid conspiracists’ worldview, both ideological and ontological, solidifies into “the spiritual wrestling match between
good and evil which is the paranoid’s archetypal model of the world.”125 Thus, the paranoid
conspiracist is deeply fearful because of their personal/ideological view of history, pedantic
attention to factoids, and their sense-making process of leaping from ‘facts’ to the allencompassing conspiracies and omnipresent conspirators who allegedly coordinate world events.
Regarding paranoid conspiracist leaders, Hofstadter claims they have certain
characteristics. Instead of using the Burkean language of “perfecting a scapegoat,” Hofstadter
discusses “villains” (conspirators) and how “vivid” (perfected) paranoid conspiracists
rhetorically construct those villains.126 Some paranoid conspiracist leaders, who become extreme
and “militant,” such as Adolf Hitler, constructed the “International Jew” as vivid villains who
orchestrated Germany’s problems. Other paranoid leaders are “uncompromising,” such as Joseph
McCarthy, “Since what is at stake is always a conflict between absolute good and absolute evil,
what is necessary is…to fight things out to a finish.”127 As prefaced in my Background Chapter,
McCarthy fought to his finish in the Senate. Nixon, however, did not imbibe the militancy or
uncompromising nature of a paranoid leader, as my analysis shows. In sum, although not
solidified into a systematic method of analysis, many original elements of Hofstadter’s theory
were taken up by rhetorical scholars, and later put into a framework of evaluative criteria.
After thirty years of intermittent rhetorical studies from the paradigm of the paranoid
style, two scholars advanced a four-part critical method of “Evaluative Criteria for Conspiracy
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Arguments.”128 The first criterion is “sign reasoning.” This type of reasoning is common in
conspiracist narratives, which unite disparate facts into a grand sense-making story. It also
demonstrates the power of association through narrative, in that “Lacking documentation, the
entire fabric of this narrative depends on association.”129 As long as the story eschews internal
contradiction, some will be persuaded by associative, sign reasoning that relies on suggestion.
The second criterion is a reincarnation of Hofstadter’s pedantry, in which a conspiracist
accumulates a “wealth of trivial detail… [which] serves no true informational function.”130 This
process “transforms all data into indisputable ‘evidence’.”131 The presentation of this pedantic
evidence skews a conspiracist’s argumentative structure – leading the authors to their third
criterion: quasi-logical arguments. These arguments mimic traditional syllogisms, and may fool
the untrained auditor, but under scrutiny, “the use of logical fallacy, particularly the false
dilemma, [which] exemplifies coercive communication” can be exposed.132 Therefore, the ability
to spot a false-dilemma signals a quasi-logical paranoid argument.
Young and Launer’s final evaluative criterion is “assuming the conclusion.”133 Akin to
“begging the question,” the “circular reasoning” fallacy, or Hofstadter’s paranoid leap, this
erroneous causation is propagated by pedantically substituting “repetition for proof,”134 while the
conspiracist treats correlation as causation. This type of self-sealing argument re-inscribes all
details – even opposing details – into the argument’s circular rationale. The conspiracist’s
imperative for drawing a stark conclusion directly follows their construction of a false dilemma
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through the use of vilification and either-or language. “The appeal of the conspiracy story is its
self-sealing nature,” which is primarily derived through circular reasoning.135 The overall effect
of assuming the conclusion, along with the other paranoid criteria, is the construction of a
complete sense-making, conspiracistic worldview that accounts for all troubling events and
simplistically answers all lingering questions.
Young and Launer, having clarified the original theory, are mostly in agreement with
Hofstadter on the methods and effects of conspiracism. The primary distinction between the
foundational work and Young and Launer, though, is the latter recognition that conspiracism can
sound logical. Yet, other rhetorical scholars continue to operate out of the paranoid tradition and
view all conspiracy theories as illogical and on the fringes of society. The rise of conspiracism in
the internet age has even led some, using the paranoid paradigm, to lament the “failure” of the
social sciences to expunge conspiracism through rational argumentation.136
Toward a Political Style of Conspiracy
A critique of the paranoid style developed, though, which first took on Hofstadter’s
“vivid villain” concept. These rhetoricians, unconvinced that all conspiracy rhetoric was a
product of the lunatic fringe, returned to Burke’s early work on the concept of “scapegoating,”
and began theorizing a shift away from “paranoid” rhetoric to “conspiracy” rhetoric. “Paranoia”
had begun to foreclose the serious study of such rhetoric, and the less-negative connotation of
“conspiracy” enabled new criticism and theory.
Although Burke viewed Hitler as a madman, this does not mean Burke wanted to ignore
Hitler’s mainstream conspiracy rhetoric. In fact, Burke posits, “A people trained in pragmatism
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should want to inspect this magic,”137 and not merely dismiss the rhetoric as the paranoid product
of a lunatic. The realization that conspiracy rhetoric could be in the political mainstream allowed
scholars to challenge Hofstadter’s basic assumption that paranoid/conspiracy rhetoric was only a
negative, fringe phenomenon. Eventually the “political style of conspiracy” emerged from this
critical conspiracy scholarship.
Although not yet named the “political style,” some of the initial resistance to paranoid
scholarship began with an examination of Watergate (the scandal which ended Nixon’s
presidency). Since the Watergate scandal started within the President’s administration and
affected the highest office of government, it was clear that “The ‘paranoid style’ had moved
away from ideological extremes to the mainstream of political life.”138 Therefore, Nixon used
mainstream conspiracy rhetoric.
Tracing the movement of a conspiracy discourse from fringe to mainstream was soon
called “mapping.” The most important study tracing conspiracy arguments analyzes the LincolnDouglas Debates as its case.139 Those debates demonstrated that conspiracy arguments (against
the slave power conspiracy) could migrate into and remain in mainstream discourse, rather than
being relegated to the paranoid, “lunatic fringe.” Studying the debate, Zarefsky argues during
times of societal strain, conspiracy claims can help a politician differentiate his or her position
from a rival with a similar position. Conspiracy arguments “forc[e] a wedge between apparently
similar positions and thereby requir[e] of the people a real choice.”140 Essentially, conspiracism
gives agency to the political conspiracist through the conspiracist’s ‘explanation’ of anomalies

Burke, “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s ‘Battle’,” 192.
G. Thomas Goodnight & John Poulakos, “Conspiracy Rhetoric,” 299 (emphasis mine).
139
David Zarefsky, “Conspiracy Arguments in the Lincoln-Douglas Debates,” Journal of the American
Forensic Association 21, (1984): 63-75.
140
Zarefsky, “Conspiracy Arguments in the Lincoln-Douglas Debates,” 73.
137
138

48

and unknown evils or in creating space between like arguments.141 Even though Lincoln and
Douglas used conspiracism with self-sealing logic, their rhetoric was politically useful.
Other theorists further enriched mainstream conspiracy theory. Historian Robert
Goldberg traced the migration of five modern conspiracies142 from fringe to near-mainstream,
before each conspiracy theory receded to the fringes of American society.143 But whereas
Zarefsky’s early work and Goldberg’s book tried to identify mainstream conspiracies within the
paradigm of Hofstadter’s paranoid style, Michael Pfau, working with Zarefsky, began to
articulate an entirely different style, at century’s end. Using conspiracy scholarship and
Hariman’s work on the political style, Pfau eventually put forth the “political style of
conspiracy,” which he argues is fully outside the paranoid paradigm.
The major purpose of Hariman’s book was not only to redefine style as decorum, but to
also use the redefinition of style practically to study “political experience.”144 Therefore, when
style/decorum is united with politics (defined as a way of acting in and thinking about the
world),145 a practical definition of political style emerges for the critic: “a coherent repertoire of
rhetorical conventions depending on aesthetic reactions for political effect.”146 Depending on the
era, cultural attitudes, and the amount of fear within a society, rhetorical conventions adapt to
each epoch – as a rhetor adapts to an audience. “In order to understand the social reality of
politics, we can consider how political action involves acting according to a particular political

Zarefsky, “Conspiracy Arguments in the Lincoln-Douglas Debates,” 71-4.
The Five conspiracies in the book are the JFK assassination, UFO cover-ups, the New World Order,
Apocalyptic/Antichrist conspiracies, and Anti-Semitic conspiracies.
143
Robert Alan Goldberg. Enemies Within: The Culture of Conspiracy in Modern America. Connecticut:
Yale University Press, 2001.
144
Hariman, Political Style, 7.
145
Hariman, Political Style, 195.
146
Hariman, Political Style, 4.
141
142

49

style.”147 Therefore, a new frame was needed, from which the critic could understand
conspiracism as an appropriately styled response to the social fears of a time – as in the
formative years for the Republican Party (Lincoln) or in the early Cold War (Nixon). Moreover,
Hariman argues political styles have certain hallmarks which typify them, because “As a style
succeeds, it articulates specific rules of usage for the composition of self.”148 This insight into
political style and stylistic rules gave Pfau and Zarefsky a framework from which to vigorously
re-investigate conspiracy rhetoric and critique weaknesses in the paranoid-style paradigm.
New Evaluative Criteria: The Civic Republican Frame
Together, Zarefsky and Pfau’s first move was to directly engage Young and Launer on
the notion of “evaluative criteria.” After Young and Launer had proposed evaluative criteria for
the paranoid style (1995), Zarefsky countered with suggesting narrative criticism for Abraham
Lincoln texts, since Zarefsky did not believe Lincoln was in the paranoid style, or used the
evaluative criteria Young and Launer put forward (1997). At the same time, Hasian examined the
“Protocols of the Elders of Zion,” and problematized the low evaluative bar set by narrative
criteria: fidelity and probability – which he argued this anti-Semitic text, as well as Mein Kampf,
met.149 This posed a theoretical need, since “Obviously, [conspiracism] is unable to stand up to
the rigorous formal standards of logic and argument. On the other hand, it is too easily able to
pass muster according to criteria of narrative evaluation.”150 This statement acted as a wedge,
from which Zarefsky and Pfau began working on a theoretical solution.
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Using the case of the slave-power conspiracy, Zarefsky and Pfau “undertook a
preliminary approach to evaluation founded upon the notion of frame,” particularly “considering
frames comparatively.”151 Comparing the various argumentative (ideological) frames involved in
the debate over slavery’s expansion into Texas and other western territories, the authors argued
“it will be possible to evaluate whether [a conspiracistic] explanation of the Texas annexation
controversy was more or less likely in relation to alternate explanations.”152 Therefore Zarefsky
and Pfau map the frame of Northern, Civic Republican, conspiracists.153
Civic Republicanism is a meta-ideology which conceives of the state as the entity that
secures the public good and ensures liberty. This framing “views the republic…as fundamentally
fragile and finite, continually threatened by conspiracies on the part of ambitious individuals as
well as self-interested factions.”154 But the ambitious individuals in the slave-power conspiracy
were not constructed as diabolical or omnipotent – as would a paranoid conspiracist. The civic
republican frame instead ascribes the motive of gaining political power (a natural human desire
within this frame) to the conspiracy and viewed the conspirators as merely using “the available
political means of the nineteenth century American political landscape in order to further their
agenda.”155 A prudent civic republican, therefore, must be eternally vigilant against myriad
conspiracies which are trying to topple the fragile state and consolidate power for conspiratorial
ends. Within this “worldview, then, conspiracy discourse was the purview of the vigilant and
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virtuous citizen and politician rather than the crackpot or lunatic.”156 In sum, civic republicanism
attributes agency to cabals, but it also gives agency to vigilant citizens who “might slow, or
temporarily prevent, the state’s decay,” even allowing space for conspiracists to warn the polity
about alleged conspiratorial danger in a politically-intelligible style.157 This ideological frame is
unlike less-mainstream meta-ideologies (Puritanism158 or Fascism159) that have been connected
to paranoid conspiracy rhetorics.
Comparing the civic republican conspiracist frame to three other prevalent frames of the
time, Zarefsky and Pfau conclude that this frame was not inferior. Each of the other frames was
problematic in their own way – somewhat un-factual, untruthful or selective historically. One
competing frame even furthered a rival conspiracy to the slave-power conspiracy (e.g. this was a
Southern frame of resistance to Texas annexation denouncing an International Abolitionist
Conspiracy).160 Zarefsky and Pfau conclude that as critics, they categorically cannot say this was
a paranoid conspiracy because of its cautious framing and because these civic republican
arguments, although “perhaps somewhat exaggerated, appear to have contained at least a germ of
truth.”161 Moreover, they warn about the difficulty of evaluating conspiracy claims, since critics
“are themselves affected by frames that influence their views of politics, of what counts as
conspiracy, and whether the term is inherently pejorative or more neutral.”162
Thus, Zarefsky and Pfau began their reclamation work of conspiracy arguments through
the Texas Annexation case study. Not only did these authors warn critics of bias, they posited the
word “conspiracy” is neutral (not negative) and conspiracists as occasionally correct. In sum,
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“What some call conspirac[ism] is little more than a sound strategy.”163 When individual rhetors
use conspiracistic arguments, moreover, strategies such as appeals to authority and appeals to
history (especially to the British Enlightenment or classical Roman history) seem to work
especially well.164 Recounting these histories enables rhetors to embody revered, authoritative,
figures such as Edmund Burke or Cicero – an ethos-building technique Pfau would subsequently
call imatatio.165
Civic (Republican) Fear
Before discussing Pfau’s full revision of Hofstadter’s paranoid style with his political
style, however, the relationship between civic republicanism and fear needs to be explicated. In
order to argue that conspiracism in a political sense can be somewhat factual and ethical, a new
understanding of fear appeals was theorized. Traditionally, fear appeals have been understood by
rhetorical scholars as “instance[s] in which a rhetor ‘tries to get a target audience to adopt a
course of action by portraying the only alternative as some horrible disaster (usually death or
sever injury) that is very fearful to the audience’.”166 This conception does not fit the anti-slavepower conspiracist rhetors during the Texas Annexation fight, though, since the conspirators
were never constructed as wholly diabolical or omnipotent, as paranoid conspiracists would have
done. Thus, it was noted that traditionally paranoid fear appeals operate “according to a logic of
dichotomization”167 which “‘sharply divides the respondent’s available options into two mutually
exclusive actions’ in which ‘the only way you can avoid this very fearful outcome is to take the
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recommended action’.”168 These dichotomous fear appeals fail, however, to accurately describe
the fear appeals of prudent civic republican conspiracists uniting political opposition to Texas
Annexation.
Using Aristotle’s work on Politics, Pfau argues that classical theory suggests two types
fear an orator may instill in an audience. The first is a divisive “dichotomous fear;” the second is
a unifying “civic fear.” As opposed the dichotomous fear, civic fear can be constructed if an
orator first raises awareness about an underappreciated object of fear (such as a cabal), portrays
the object of fear as “close at hand (spatially and/or temporally),” claims audience action can
thwart the threat, and inspires courage-to-act within the audience, “[i]n order to open a space for
deliberation about the range of possible actions capable of addressing the object of fear.”169
Thus, these two contrasting fear appeals work to opposite ends, since dichotomous fear
“bypass[es] collective reason,” aiming “to foreclose all options except for the course of action
recommended by the speaker,”170 while, on the other hand, civic fear encourages the polity to
discuss and then address the problem collectively.
Prime examples of civic fear appeals and civic republicanism come from Pfau’s book on
the Political Style of Conspiracy: Chase, Sumner and Lincoln, which studies early Republicans
and their anti-slave power conspiracism. Interestingly, Pfau argues the distinction between
dichotomous and civic fear is “a distinction that parallels this study’s findings regarding the
distinction between conspiracy rhetoric at the fringe and center.”171 Of course, speakers may take
fear appeals too far, and become dichotomous fear mongers like Joseph McCarthy. Nixon,
though, was careful to typically remain within the civic republican frame and ere on the side of
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civic fear appeals in most of his anti-communist conspiracy rhetoric – although at times he
pragmatically blends ideological frames and feigns dichotomous fear appeals.
Fear and frame are in addition to the four evaluative criteria demarcating the political
style from the paranoid style. Frame precedes and shapes a speech and fear is an effect of hearing
a speech’s suasive appeal. The four criteria of the political style discussed in the next section of
this chapter, however, are not formative or an effect of the text, but rather they are within the
argumentative structure of the texts. Each of these criteria emerged from Pfau’s case studies of
Lincoln, Chase and Sumner rhetoric.
THE POLITICAL STYLE
The working definition of ideology for this study is “a symbolically mediated set of
interact[ing] assumptions, beliefs, values, feelings, and attitudes by which humans make their
world meaningful.”172 But what specific criteria typify the rhetoric of civic republican
conspiracists? Like his co-authored work with Zarefsky on Texas Annexation, to distinguish the
political style from the paranoid, Pfau focuses not on the lunatic fringe, but on an explicitly
political movement which utilized anti-slave power conspiracism to mobilize the electorate and
build a coalition in the 1850s. This political coalition still exists, and is called the Republican
Party.173 This new party inched away from more radical (and primarily religiously zealous)
abolitionists and instead took on a secular, more moderate anti-slavery view. This moderating
move united former Whigs, Free Soilers, Know Nothings, and even persuaded some Northern
Democrats to join the new party. Conspiracy rhetoric was a major factor uniting the anti-slavery
factions into an ever-unifying Republican Party. Therefore, while previous, paranoid-paradigm
scholarship “set the stage for the marginalization of conspiracy discourse by establishing the
172
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presumption that conspiracy rhetoric is fundamentally irrational, unethical, and unhealthy for the
political system,”174 Pfau uses the conspiracy rhetoric of early Republican Party leaders to refute
all these presumptions. The result is the “political style of conspiracy.”
Four major characteristics delineate the political style from the paranoid.175 First, the
political style employs a comic plot – unlike a paranoid conspiracist who perceives a tragic plot.
Comic conspiracists view cabals as “driven by misunderstanding and error and are resolved
when participants learn the truth and overcome their misperceptions.”176 Therefore, the comic
view is somewhat optimistic. “Tragic plots, on the other hand, are driven by a tragic flaw or
condition and are resolved in a climactic tragic event that leaves little room for optimism
regarding human agency.”177 Thus, a tragic conspirator is malicious, possibly evil and can only
be overthrown in a type of apocalyptic struggle.178
The relationship between tragic radicalism and violent means, of course, reflects
a logic of proportionality – tragic narratives of all-powerful conspiracies represent
threats whose magnitude requires recourse even to violence.179

At times Nixon perceives the communist conspiracy as nearly world-wide and all-powerful, but
in the first two texts of analysis, he remains within a comic plot – suggesting a minimal number
of caveats about communism to not fully foreclose the possibility of communism being mistaken
rather than malicious. In the third text, however, Nixon uses a tragic plot in his anti-communist
rhetoric.

174

Pfau, The Political Style of Conspiracy, 175.
Five characteristics from Michael Pfau’s book: The Political Style of Conspiracy, 2005.
176
Pfau, The Political Style of Conspiracy, 28.
177
Ibid.
178
Pfau, The Political Style of Conspiracy, 31 – this comes from work on William Lloyd Garrison, whose
move to post-millennial eschatology eventuated his endorsement of violent means to combat the slave
power, following John Brown’s raid.
179
Pfau, The Political Style of Conspiracy, 32.
175

56

Second, a political conspiracist sees a recent “key cardinal function” (origin) for the
conspiracy rather than the age-old, irreversible origins paranoid conspiracists perceive. “[In]
most narratives of conspiracy, one particular event will serve as the key cardinal function of the
conspiracy narrative.”180 Pfau compares two William Lloyd Garrison speeches and two Salmon
Chase speeches to illuminate this criterion. As Garrison became more radical in his abolitionism
in the 1830-40s, he saw an ever-earlier key cardinal function. Garrison’s earlier rhetoric named
the conspiracy’s origin as the Compromise of 1820, but eventually he claimed the Constitution
itself (that “covenant with death, and an agreement with hell”) was the “point at which the slave
power initially gained ascendancy and was able to fully control subsequent events.”181 Following
his new perception of the Constitution and its framers as diabolical, Garrison’s progressing
paranoia led him to abandon his former pacifism and advocate that the country, evil to its
founding document, be violently overthrown.
Conversely, Salmon Chase’s conspiracism moved in an opposite, increasingly-political
direction, due to his ever-more-recent key cardinal function. While Chase first claimed postRevolutionary War apathy was the key cardinal function of the slave-power conspiracy, later he
named the Kansas-Nebraska act of 1854 (a contemporary event) as the recent key cardinal
function. Further contrasting Garrison, when Chase spoke of the origins of the slave power
conspiracy, he used secular terms rather than radical religiosity, and the effect was the
unification of political factions into the Republican Party. Pfau concludes “These comic
emplotments, along with shorter conspiracy narratives, encourage more effectual efforts against
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the slave power”182 – demonstrating the synchrony of the first two political-style evaluative
criteria.
Third, political conspiracism uses conductive arguments, which place the suasive onus on
the audience and their ability to make a conclusive leap which has only been hinted at by the
rhetor. Trudy Grovier defined a conductive argument as a “non-deductive,” particularist mode of
argumentation, characterized by “a sort of reasoning in which (1) a conclusion about some
individual case (2) is drawn non-conclusively (3) from one or more premises about the same case
(4) without any appeal to other cases.”183 Pfau’s pinnacle example of conductive argumentation
is Lincoln’s 1858 campaign speech, “House Divided.”
This conspiracistic speech constructs the Union as a metaphorical house, which cannot
stand if it is divided by rampant regionalism (North and South). Lincoln, who was running for
Senate against Stephen Douglas, suggests a Democratic slave-power cabal is protecting the
‘peculiar institution’ of the South in exchange for support of four northern politicians: Senator
Douglas, the former and current Presidents (Pierce and Buchanan), and Supreme Court Chief
Justice Roger Taney, who issued the Dred Scott decision (allowing slave holders to bring their
‘property’ into free territories). If civic fear was not instilled in Lincoln’s audience to unite and
courageously stop this slave power conspiracy, he warned that another high court ruling (the
suspected Dred Scott II) would also allow slave owners to bring slaves into free, northern
states.184 Lincoln uses humor and implication to make his case, but refrained from “mak[ing] the
final deductive leap characteristic of much [paranoid] conspiracy discourse.”185 Instead, it is a
non-conclusive placement of four suspected conspirators (“timbers”) into a metaphorical “house”
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frame-work, while avoiding pedantic recollection of national events, self-sealing logic, deductive
argument, or paranoid leaps to conclusion. Instead, Lincoln unites this third criterion of the
political style with the first two: a recent key cardinal function (Dred Scott case, four years
prior), and a comic plot of mistaken, not malicious, Democratic antagonists in the political
mainstream.
Concerning antagonists, we come to the fourth and final criteria of the political style: a
non-perfected conspirator as scapegoat. Although this is the least explicit criterion in Pfau’s
work, the “House Divided” speech gives a great example of how to construct a conspiratorial
scapegoat without perfecting it. Burke and Hofstadter used a paranoid paradigm in which “The
symbolic function of the scapegoat – both individual and collective – is said to be enhanced
insofar as the scapegoat’s evil and power are emphasized or exaggerated” – or perfected by the
conspiracist(s).186 For example, “Garrison’s perfection of the slave power scapegoat helped to
build and affirm abolitionist identity.”187 Yet this perfection, combined with a tragic plot,
promulgated dire pessimism and foreclosed mainstream political engagement. The result was
that many abolitionists gave up, while a few resorted to violence, as evidenced in John Brown’s
massacre of enemy slave-power conspirators, who he viewed as evil, perfected, scapegoats.
Alternatively, in the “House Divided” speech, Lincoln rhetorically constructs Stephen
Douglas as a banal, non-perfected scapegoat. Using humor, metaphor, and statements of
likelihood (not certitude), Lincoln ethically characterizes Douglas as incompatible with
Republican values. If young, inexperienced Republicans are only “living dogs,” Lincoln argues
they are still preferable to a has-been, “dead lion” Democratic Party leader.188 Although Douglas
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was an out-spoken anti-slavery voice in the past, Lincoln argues that years of compromising with
the South turned Douglas into a Southern apologist, effectively enabling the slave power
conspiracy. Lincoln concludes, “Judge Douglas, if not a dead lion, for this work, is at lease a
caged and toothless one”189 for the continuing anti-slavery work. Furthermore, Lincoln lawyerly
states, “I wish not to misrepresent Judge Douglas’s position,”190 while even refusing to foreclose
the possibility that Douglas “may rightfully change when he finds himself wrong.”191 As for
scapegoating the Democratic Party as a whole, although Lincoln twice calls them the “enemy” in
the conclusion of the speech, he qualifies this by saying the once “disciplined, proud, and
pampered” Party is now “wavering, dissevered, and belligerent.”192 Therefore, not only are
Douglas and his Party non-perfected scapegoats, but Lincoln’s civic fear appeals inspire courage
among Republicans to the appropriate actions of political unity and moderation in the antislavery movement. In sum, this banal, politically-conspiracistic scapegoating is far from the
perfected scapegoating of vivid villains described in Hofstadter and Burke’s work on Hitler and
paranoid conspiracism.
Following his case studies and four new criteria, Pfau concludes that there are “two
distinct yet… parallel species of conspiracy discourse with distinct traditions:” the paranoid
style, and the political style of conspiracy.193 Unlike theorists who argued conspiracism only
originates at the fringes of society and can never fully reach the mainstream, Pfau concludes that
the political-style originates in the mainstream and can remain there for quite some time if the
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conspiracistic group builds a political coalition against a recent conspiracy, through a comic
narrative plot, while refusing to perfect the conspirator as scapegoat.194
The political style also disrupts the lineage of conspiracy.
[W]hile the paranoid style was the first…category of conspiracy discourse within the
academy, its historical origins may be relatively recent. As a number of scholars – and
the findings of this study – have made clear, however, a very different and much older
form of conspiracy discourse characterizes the texts at the center of this study:195

the political style of conspiracy – which can be traced back to Cicero. This is much older than
the history of the paranoid style (which has only been traced to the British Enlightenment).196
Therefore, this style of political conspiracy in the mainstream, with ancient roots, leads to
two major implications – one rational and one ethical. First, the critic should avoid assumption of
irrationality, because, “It may help the critic to recognize that some conspiracy claims –
especially those concerned with the increasing concentrations of economic and political power –
deserve our serious attention if not outright support.”197 Returning to his early work with
Zarefsky on the seeming factuality of some conspiracist claims in the civic republican frame,
Pfau has now intensified those implications to outright support of some political conspiracism,
propagating the contemporary example of Ralph Nadar’s rational, anti-corporate conspiracy
claims.
Second, ethically, the political style is unlike the paranoid style. The result of its framing,
fear appeals and four evaluative criteria is that:
the political style of conspiracy discourse is not ethically problematic in the same sense
as the paranoid style, and it seems erroneous to equate ethically…the paranoid,
eschatologically-charged, and anti-Semitic New World Order conspiracy theories
inspiring contemporary terrorist Timothy McVeigh with the corporate conspiracy
theories of Ralph Nader.198
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Therefore, Pfau suggests a different method of analysis, so scholars will not conflate, and
effectively undo, his careful bifurcation of these vastly different styles of conspiracy. Since he
finds strictly neo-classical, narrative, or close-textual methods all insufficient for studying
conspiracy rhetoric on their own, Pfau suggests “an evaluative approach that compares
conspiracy claims to alternate interpretations within thoroughly contextualized accounts of
political controversies seems more sensible.”199 Pfau calls this method a Comparative-Textual
approach.
This suggested method concludes Pfau and Zarefsky’s detailed mapping of the political
style, with its four intra-textual criteria, civic republican ideological frame and civic fear appeals.
Their long project to revise conspiracy research in the field carries the weight of astute
scholarship. In the end, in my estimation, Pfau certainly met his goal: “to do for conspiracy
discourse at the center what Hofstadter has done for conspiracy rhetoric at the fringe.”200
Recapitulation of Existing Styles
Following this lengthy discussion of style, and conspiracy scholarship in the field, I
should quickly summarize the elements of the paranoid and political styles which I am looking
for in my analysis Richard Nixon’s conspiracistic texts.
4 Paranoid-Style Criteria:
1. Construction of a Perfected Scapegoat, or “vivid villain.”
2. The Pedantic accumulation of ‘facts,’ and the tragic situating of those factoids into narrative
meta-structures.
3. The use of Circular (self-sealing) Argument, which assumes its paranoid conclusions.
4. Construction of a conspiracy as an all-powerful, All-Encompassing Cabal.
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4 Political-Style Criteria:
1. Construction of a likely, or probable, Non-Perfected Scapegoat.
2. Conductive Argument in which premises are placed next to each other spatially, although the
rhetor refrains from conclusively connecting the premises or assigning causation.
3. The use of a Comic Plot by a conspiracist rhetor, casting conspirators as mistaken, not evil,
and conspiracies as erroneous and revisable, not all-encompassing.
4. The cabal’s origin is contemporary: a Recent Key Cardinal Function. As such, the cabal can
be challenged, reversed, or even overcome by vigilant citizens.
Although these two distinct styles of conspiracy rhetoric have been theorized in the field,
my initial readings of conspiracistic Richard Nixon texts did not allow me to place him squarely
within either the paranoid or the political style. Nixon’s tricky rhetoric and political ascendency
was at first perplexing, but style gave me a point of intervention. “The key to political success
might be knowing (however intuitively) when to be aesthetically sensitive and when to be
relatively anesthetized, and knowing when to activate a political style and when to keep it under
wraps.”201 As I read and re-read the three texts that comprise the artifacts of my study, some
paranoid elements could be seen in Nixon’s conspiracy rhetoric, which are more “aesthetically”
noticeable, or stylized. However criteria from the political style, which is more “anesthetized,”
could also be identified in each text. This coincides with Hariman’s claim that a knowledge of
“decorum in order to understand and act to advantage within a social situation was… an
essentially pragmatic approach.”202 Therefore, as I observed the separation between existing
conspiracy styles seems to collapse within Nixon’s anti-communist conspiracy rhetoric, it
became apparent that Nixon’s pragmatic assessment of rhetorical situations and the
accompanying decorum directed his pragmatic movement between the paranoid and political
styles of conspiracy rhetoric. Thus, this study adds the concept of pragmatism to the existing
201
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paranoid and political styles as a way to explain Nixon’s stylistic overlapping and sampling from
both political and paranoid criteria.
DRAMATISM & PRAGMATISM
The “dramatistic” method of rhetorical criticism enables my addition of the concept of
“pragmatism” to conspiracy theory. Since Nixon was an actor, bluffer, and debater, dramatism
also fits his personality. Using the theatre as a model, Kenneth Burke suggested a dramatistic
method to examine speakers’ motives. The five investigative terms of his Dramatistic Pentad are:
“Act, Scene, Agent, Agency, Purpose.”203 Each text in my analysis has the same agent/actor –
Richard Nixon – however each text performs a different act (gain fame, appear presidential, and
vindicate), occurs in a different scene (rhetorical situation), while adjusting the veracity of
Nixon’s agency (conspiracism) to accommodate his various purposes. This study is focused on
Nixon’s pragmatic overlapping of paranoid and political conspiracy styles, and I argue his
stylistic fluidity created conspiracist agency (the means, or instrument) in Nixon’s rhetoric.204
In determining dramatistic motivation, ratios, or “principles of selectivity,” emerge.205
“Otherwise stated: A ratio is a formula indicating a transition from one term to another,”206 with
the generating term listed first. For example, if agency is the generating term for a certain
purpose, it would be expressed as the ratio agency-purpose. This specific ratio can be restated as
a means-to-an-end.207 Ratios are not just one-way streets, but more of an implication, as purpose
is “implicit in agency, since tools and methods are for a purpose – and one of the great reasons
for the appeal of pragmatism today… may reside in the fact that it retains ingredients of
203
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purpose.”208 I argue, therefore, that Nixon pragmatically used varying degrees of conspiracism to
accommodate the purpose and rhetorical situation of each text; an agentic means for political
ends.
When agency is the generative term in the ratio, moreover, it is implicitly linked to
pragmatism. In “the featuring of agency,” Burke writes, “the corresponding [philosophic]
terminology is pragmatism.”209 Pragmatism can be taken up by any major philosophy through its
emphasis on particulars (like nominalism), practicality (utilitarianism), and “disdain for verbal
solutions, useless questions and metaphysical abstractions” (realism).210 Since pragmatism is a
common mediation in all philosophies, it could be taken up by any political actor, “quite as the
instructions for operating a machine are the same for liberal, Fascist, or Communist”211 – or as I
argue, conspiracist. Pragmatism, therefore, transforms theories into instruments,212 and makes
the underlying ideology of conspiracism less important – whether it is more paranoid (e.g.
fascist) or more political (e.g. civic republican).
Nixon’s belief in conspiracy theories became instrumental through his pragmatic rhetoric.
Therefore, the agency (conspiracism) generating Nixon’s motive in his anti-communist texts
stems in part from his underlying, implicit pragmatism, documented in chapter two (analytical
debater, who argued for the sake of argument). This instrumental agency is not that of an
ideologue or someone with unshakeable beliefs (or “bedrock values”), but by an actor desiring
political expediency. Throughout Nixon’s political ascendency, this was often the charge labeled
against him – he was steered by no moral compass, but rather self-interest.
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Not only does pragmatism’s de-emphasis of ideology fit Nixon, also the view that “the
pragmatist looks for the ‘cash value’ of an idea”213 resonates with Nixon’s strident capitalism
and anti-communism. Effectively, the post-WWII Republican campaign slogan depicted
Democrats as soft on socialism at home and communism abroad. This conflates both ideologies
and market structures in the minds of voters. In my analysis of Nixon’s second text especially, it
becomes clear that the pragmatic trope of capitalism as the faith of freedom “retains the stress
upon agency, in using a mode of thought according to which a thing’s value is tested by its
economic usefulness.”214 Therefore, both Nixon’s issue of expertise (his pro-capitalism and anticommunism) and the agency with which he denounced it (overlapping conspiracist styles) were
pragmatic.
As I describe in my analysis, “such [individual rhetorical] agency is fundamentally
shaped by existing discursive and aesthetic conditions, which vary from one social context to
another.”215 I argue Nixon pragmatically adapted his rhetoric to audiences, adjusted his veracity
to match situational exigency, and styled his conspiracism to fit the constraining decora of the
moment. The effect of this pragmatic style is a collective style that invoked "a meaningful
resonance among disparate, even ‘contradictory,’ social interests,”216 such as the isolationists,
hawks, eastern/liberal Republicans, conservatives, the religious, and other factions of the early
Cold War Republican Party. Nixon’s rhetoric and fluid conspiracist style seems to have struck a
harmonious cord among social, and Party, disunity of the day. Astutely matching rhetoric and
situation, Nixon accrued agency, gained power and political offices, while pragmatically styling
his rhetoric to fit the decorum of each aesthetic or anesthetized situation.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ANALYSIS
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This chapter does comparative-textual analysis of three early-career Nixon anticommunist conspiracy texts. The three texts span fifteen years – starting with Nixon’s first
speech as an elected official in 1947, then a campaign pamphlet from his failed 1960 Presidential
campaign, and finally “The Hiss Case” chapter of his first book, written in 1962 at the beginning
of his “wilderness years” out of public office. For each of these texts I use the synthesized
method for evaluating conspiracy rhetoric developed through the literature review in my Method
Chapter. I consider which of the four paranoid and four political-style elements are in each text.
Words, phrases and sentences from my close readings of these texts evidence my analysis.
The “Maiden Speech,” 1947
In the “Maiden Speech,” Nixon calls for the House of Representatives to recognize the
utter “contempt” alleged communist conspirator Gerhart Eisler demonstrated in a HUAC
hearing. In the first sentence of the speech Nixon intimates that the conspirator in question is part
of larger “foreign-directed conspiracy.” Again in the second sentence Eisler is designated as
“The principal character of this conspiracy” in the United States. Then in paragraphs three and
four of the speech, Nixon mentions “Two other conspirators and comrades of Eisler.” Thus,
words derived from “to conspire” are used four times in this short speech,217 clustered in the
introduction, to prepare the auditor for all the shocking, conspiratorial, details to follow. While
Nixon only constructs a vague foreign conspiracy, he concretely casts Eisler and his “comrades”
as conspirators. Throughout the rest of the speech, Nixon offers evidence to prove Eisler is not
only a communist who held a HUAC meeting in contempt, but he was atop the American
Communist Party apparatus while he actively plotted and “advocated the overthrow of our
Government by force and violence” (Para. 20).
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Although this early conspiracist speech fits three criteria of the paranoid style, it is not
solely paranoid, as it has a recent key cardinal function. 1933 is the year Nixon, quoting an FBI
report, claims Eisler began to “shuttle back and forth between Moscow and the United States”
(Para. 1). Since the speech was given in 1947, the key cardinal function is only fourteen years
old, and is therefore recent. Had Nixon gone farther back, or made claims that about Eisler or
Moscow being “corrupted from their beginnings,” a case could be made for paranoia. As is, the
key cardinal function is recent and squarely in the political style.
The three paranoid-style evaluative criteria in the speech are the perfected scapegoat,
pedantic accumulation of detail, and circular argumentation. Interestingly, though, the speech is
also within the civic republican ideological frame. In the following analysis each of these
criteria, as well as the incomplete conspiracistic criteria, are detailed.
Considering first the paranoid style, Nixon clearly perfects his scapegoat, Gerhart Eisler.
Nixon saw Eisler not only as the liaison between the American Communist Party and
“Communist International” conspiracy, but also the “master mind [of] the political and espionage
activities of the Communist Party in the United States” (Para. 1). Multiple uses of the words
“foreign,” “international,” and “alien” allow Nixon to use associative reasoning to connect Eisler
with conspiracy mostly outside the USA. Since Eisler was born in Germany and now resides in
the USA, he left “war-ravaged Europe” and has infiltrated the “safe haven” of America (Para. 2).
Therefore, he not only displayed ungratefulness to the country that offered him refuge, but he
began attacking that country’s government. When the American government called Eisler to
testify before HUAC regarding his activities, “he did not come as a grateful political refugee” but
as “an arrogant, defiant enemy of that government” (Para. 2, emphasis mine).
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To further perfect Eisler as conspirator, enemy and scapegoat, Nixon cites FBI Chief J.
Edgar Hoover at length (Para.s 7-9). Quoting Hoover corroborates Nixon’s HUAC report and
greatly strengthens the freshman representative’s ethos through the double-voiced nature of the
rhetoric. Hoover states repeatedly that Eisler is an “agent” of the Communist International, and
has been in contact with Communist “functionaries” in the United States at least since 1933.
After fourteen years of faithful service, Eisler has become “the mysterious but supreme authority
on communist activity in the United States” (Para. 11). The effect is that Eisler’s activities
constitute a clandestine pattern of “evasion and duplicity” (Para. 9). To prove this charge, Nixon
again uses information from the FBI to detail Eisler’s re-entry into the United States from one of
his trips to the Soviet Union. This evidence allegedly shows that Eisler filed for asylum status
and denied “under oath” that he had 1. communist ties, 2. family in the USA – even though his
sister and wife were in the USA, 3. and had previously lived in the United States. To execute this
deception, Eisler used an alias (Para. 14). Thus, Nixon added liar to his growing vocabulary for
his scapegoat.
In case the terms liar, alien, enemy and conspirator left any doubt about perfectedness,
however, Nixon raises the hortatory bar one last time in his speech, quoting the damning
testimony of Eisler’s estranged sister. Directly engaging the claim that HUAC lacked hard
evidence and was persecuting Eisler for his “different political faith” alone, Nixon quotes
Eisler’s sister as saying Eisler was an “arch terrorist of the worst type” (Para. 16).
Justifying her use of the term “terrorist,” Nixon makes his most specific and volatile
claim yet: Eisler was passing US secrets to a “Canadian atom-bomb spy ring” (Para. 16).
Therefore not only was Eisler trying to “tear down and destroy the government which furnished
him refuge during the war years” but was even trying to corrupt Canada – our neighbor and ally
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(Para. 16). Of course, Nixon provides no evidence of how Eisler got US atomic secrets or who
his Canadian contacts were. But this specific claim of espionage increases the charge from
malicious conspirator, to frame Eisler as a traitor leaking our most important national-security
secret. Within the context of the early Cold War, Nixon’s anti-communist rhetoric is potent,
especially his fear appeal regarding nuclear proliferation. Any “agent” supporting communism
and leaking atomic secrets in that era would be a “terrorist,” and a fully perfected scapegoat.
The second paranoid-style criterion in the “Maiden Speech” is Nixon’s pedantic attention
to detail. In the speech’s first paragraph, Nixon is careful to make note of all six known aliases
used by Eisler. The audience is told each alias had a specific purpose; “Hans Berger” was
Eisler’s alias when writing, “Edwards” when at communist meetings, “Brown” when traveling,
“Eisman” for the payroll of front organizations, etc. Nixon also spends two paragraphs
elaborating on Eisler’s dubious US passport application in 1934. Allegedly Eisler conspired with
friends to forge the passport application: Leo Josephson’s handwriting, under Samuel Liptzin’s
name, with a picture of Eisler, and a signature from a fictitious “witness” (Para. 12). After the
passport was issued, Eisler sailed, under false pretenses, to Moscow for communist training. Of
course Nixon accounts for loose ends, saying both Liptzin and Josephson were subpoenaed by
HUAC, although they both furnished excuses and did not attend. Nixon ominously promises that
HUAC “will deal with Mr. Josephson and Mr. Liptzin at a very early date” at “subsequent
hearings” (Para. 5).
Regarding travel, Eisler’s global movements are pedantically traced in the speech’s
biographical section on Eisler’s life and family. Born in Germany, he joined the communist party
in Austria, “trained to be an agent of the Communist International” in Moscow – learning
“revolutionary tactics, in espionage, [and] sabotage” in the Lenin School, before taking “His first
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assignment as a Comintern agent… in China in 1928,” and finally sent to the USA in 1933
(Para.s 10-11). This pedantic account of Eisler’s birthplace, family, schooling and CP
assignments is replete with family names, town and ship names, port-of-entry cities, and mention
of all the biggest communist countries. These details work to construct a tragic narrative
enumerating the perfected scapegoat’s malicious motives. Overall, this shows Nixon’s pedantic
attention to detail, and clearly displays this second element of the paranoid style.
The third paranoid criterion is the use of circular argumentation. Although circular
argumentation is not overwhelming, a major premise of Nixon’s argument and his call to action
rest on a circular argument. This circular argument occurs when Nixon argues Eisler’s “refus[al]
even to be sworn before the committee” caused Eisler to commit “contempt” of congress (Para.
2). But going a step further, Nixon leaps to the conclusion that Eisler’s refusal to testify was not
just contempt, but in fact was further evidence of his guilt. Two points contradict this logic
however. First, the right to remain silent contradicts this circular argument. As a lawyer, Nixon
knew this, and even admits in “The Hiss Case” chapter that Hiss’s willingness to talk was the
reason Hiss perjured himself. The second contradictory point to Nixon’s second circular
argument was argued by Representative Vito Marcantonio (D-NY) in response to Nixon’s
speech. Citing the transcript of the HUAC meeting in question, Marcantonio quotes the
Chairman asking, “Mr. Eisler, do you refuse again to be sworn?” Eisler responds, “I have never
refused to be sworn in. I came here a political prisoner. I want to make a few remarks, only three
minutes, before I be sworn in and answer your questions” (Para.s 27-28). This quote allows
Marcantonio to argue that the phrase “willful contempt” is the question at hand, and that it is “a
legalistic phrase” which, technically, Eisler has not committed (Para.s 26). Marcantonio contends
that HUAC had no “concrete evidence” against Eisler, and as a result tried to pin him down on a
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procedural technicality (contempt), but in fact “This was not willful contempt” since the witness
was willing to answer any and all questions after making a statement (Para.s 25, 32). In sum,
Marcantonio argued, “the committee’s insistence on its procedure was unreasonable and this is
the decisive factor in this case” (Para. 32). In other words HUAC “establish[ed] its own
procedure” disallowing an opening statement, thus foreclosing the possibility of swearing in
Eisler – and forcing his hand into “contempt” that was never “willful” (Para. 32). The fact that
Rep. Marcantonio caught this circular argument is the effect of the presence of this third and
final criterion of paranoid conspiracism in Nixon’s speech.
At times Nixon alluded to a worldwide communist conspiracy, but always stops himself
short. Had Nixon constructed an all-encompassing cabal, it would have been the fourth paranoid
element. Whenever Nixon labels the “Communist International” and gives it near-global reach
through Eisler’s biography – (East) Germany, Austria, the Soviet Union, China, and “warravaged Europe” – Nixon then eschews a totalized view by looking stateside. Communism may
be a powerful conspiracy spreading outward from its headquartered in Moscow (Nixon mentions
“Moscow” seven times), but he inspires courage in his audience by mentioning it has not claimed
the United States. As such, it is still “a foreign-directed conspiracy” perpetrated by “aliens.”
Through these terms Nixon effectively constructs the conspiracy as ‘other’ in order to inspire
civic fear in his audience, the belief that they can keep communism out of the allied countries,
prevent the conspiracy from becoming worldwide, or possibly even reverse the spread of the
conspiracy. Although this depiction is not a comic plot, it uses civic fear to inspire courage.
In this speech, moreover, Nixon uses the civic republican frame. Nixon’s rhetoric enables
him to embody the role of a prudent/vigilant citizen, whose goals is to warn the people of danger,
while maintaining a balance of liberty and state authority. After his pedantic description of
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Eisler, Nixon instructs his listeners to adhere to common virtues, and be as vigilant as he is in
protecting the country. Nixon holds up a copy of Eisler’s passport application and “suggest[s]
that every member, at his convenience, study it, because it will give you an insight into the fraud
and intrigue which is employed by the communist agents to carry out their work” (Para. 11). For
those still not clearly seeing the threat, Nixon “recommend[s] a reading of the full transcript of
the testimony before the committee” (Para. 15). Nixon’s believes that imitating his vigilance
would lead any prudent Representative to convict a communist conspirator such as Eisler.
Interestingly, the one representative (Marcantonio) who clearly had read the HUAC transcript
disagreed with Nixon. However, as a socialist and member of the American Labor Party,
Marcantonio lacked ethos in the area of prosecuting communists and cast a lone dissenting vote.
Marcantonio’s argument lost to Nixon’s pragmatic conspiracism. In his closing lines, Nixon
typifies the civic republican notion of freedom when he first admonishes the House to “defend
vigilantly” the fundamental rights of free speech and press, only to then reiterate how fragile the
state is:
But we must bear in mind that the rights of free speech and free press do not carry with
them the right to advocate the destruction of the very government which protects the
freedom of an individual to express his views (Para. 21).

This sentiment expresses the ideal civic-republican balance between the people’s freedom and
the state’s power.
Overall, this first text gives many insights into the early conspiracist rhetoric of freshman
representative Richard Nixon. Nixon’s pedantic construction of a communist conspiracy, with
Gerhart Eisler as perfected scapegoat, and evidence of at least one significant circular argument
shows the presences of three clear paranoid criteria. Also, with the speech’s deductive reasoning
(not conductive) for a vote to hold Eisler in contempt, its non-comic plot, and perfected
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scapegoat, the single political-style element evident in this first text is its recent key cardinal
function. Therefore, the preponderance of conspiracy argumentation is in the paranoid-style.
Nixon’s pragmatic combination of styles adds nuance to his rhetoric, though. And even
though this speech was mostly in the paranoid style, considering evaluative criteria, the speech
was clearly framed by a civic republican ideology and inspired civic fear in its audience, both of
which are connected to the political style in existing literature. The effect of the speech was that
the House voted to overwhelmingly pass Nixon’s motion to find Eisler in contempt, and since
Eisler promptly fled the country, it seemed likely to many that at least some of Nixon’s claims
were true – possibly even some of the paranoid-style claims. Due to his pragmatic style and civic
republican fear, I argue Nixon is a paramount case for studying conspiracy rhetoric. He
crystallized his epoch, and quickly moved from House, to Senate, to Vice President, and ran
dead even against John Kennedy in 1960 for the office of President.
“The Meaning of Communism to Americans,” 1960
The second text I analyze was written and released by presidential candidate Nixon
immediately after he won the nomination at the Republican National Convention in 1960. It was
a campaign pamphlet deemed “one in a series of discussions on the issues of our times by
Richard M. Nixon, Vice President of the United States.”218 This text is less paranoid and more
political than the first text – actually pragmatically equal in incorporating two evaluative criteria
from each style. The text is also at least four times longer219 than the “Maiden Speech,” and its
rhetoric is more complex. From an aesthetics standpoint, the speech is much more stylized than
text one. Nixon uses many tropes, such as metaphor, analogy, anaphora/epiphora, triads, and

Pamphlet: “The Meaning of Communism to Americans,” by Vice President Richard Nixon, issued by
volunteers for Nixon-Lodge, 8/21/1960.
219
Eighty-nine paragraphs, instead of twenty-two paragraphs in the “Maiden Speech.”
218
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generally uses memorable language – including the sentence containing the one explicit mention
of “conspiracy” in this speech: “I intend in a later statement to discuss the tactics and
vulnerabilities of the Communist conspiracy and how we can best fashion a strategy for victory”
(Para. 14). The rhythm of the phrase and rhyming of “vulnerabilities of the…conspiracy” with
“strategy for victory” is stylistically pleasing.
In addition to being more polished stylistically, Nixon is also more tempered in his
rhetoric. Reasons for avoided the hortatory excesses of the text one are bi-fold. First, Nixon has
now been in politics much longer and has matured in his rhetoric. The paranoid-style rhetoric
that put Nixon on the national map necessarily became more restrained with each successive step
from Representative to Presidential candidate. This is the opposite-inverse relationship between
paranoia and office that Joseph McCarthy did not pragmatically understand like Nixon. Second,
since Nixon and Kennedy had nearly identical, hawkish views on communism, the didactic tone
of this pamphlet allows Nixon to teach the electorate that it is not enough to just “abhor
communism” (Para. 4). If the abhorrence comes from a place of ignorance, than we may become
susceptible to the charms of Marxism. Therefore, the importance of “understanding” the “threat”
of communism is what Nixon is trying to impress upon the audience. By embodying the role of
expert, Nixon distinguishes himself from Kennedy, while aiming to teach the true communist
philosophies of history, law, and economy. This objective results in a patronizing tone, however,
as Nixon over-emphasizes the understandability of the matter with an abundance of qualifying
adverbs (basically, essentially, obviously, purely, simply, accordingly, fundamentally, and other
expressions: plain fact, of course, elementary).
Although there are some appeals in the speech from the civic republican frame, it is not
the clear ideological frame of the speech. At times Nixon does appeal to a civic republican
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notion of history as cyclical to combat Marx’s notion that the progression of history will
inevitably usher in the rise of communism. Nixon argues against Marx, however, claiming
American thinkers fit “into an almost classic pattern known from antiquity” (Para. 85), while
Marxism is not progressive, but rather re-enacting a “familiar quandary” in the USSR which can
be seen elsewhere in history (Ibid). At other times, Nixon appeals to our Founding Fathers in
order to combat Marx and Engels as the founders of communism.
Despite these civic republican gestures, though, the overall didactic nature of the speech
aligns more easily with a liberal pluralist frame, which is guided by reason for the purpose of
guaranteeing rights. But although the “republican assumptions nurturing conspiracy discourse in
the nineteenth century receded in favor of a liberal pluralist ideology,” the two ideologies share a
“suspicion of concentration of power” and thus conspiracism stays “salient even within a
(modern) pluralist paradigm”220 used by Nixon as he takes on the role of expert info-provider in
the second text.
To further complicate the speech’s ideological frame, Nixon uses an extremely heavy
dose of religious terms and imagery. This indicates Puritanism as an additional ideological
frame, and pits Nixon as the priest who must teach the people about the bad religion
(communist) and its false prophets (Marx and Engels). Nixon describes the USA and USSR in a
series of contrasting religious terms. America’s “faith of freedom,” individualism and capitalist
system allow for free will, whereas the Soviet’s blind faith in communism leads to a forced
communist system, or a type of controlling predestination (Para. 67). As America is guided by its
scripture (the Constitution), its absolute truths, and “ancient wisdom” of a pantheon of “great
thinkers” (“Confucius, Mencius, Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas, Kant and Bentham” – Para. 80),
the Soviet Union is awash in the relativism and false “prophecies” of its communist scripture
220
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(the Manifesto), making an unprincipled people susceptible to the “cult of personality” around
Marx, Engels and Lenin (the Soviet anti-trinity).
To nuance his criticisms, Nixon stratifies the adherents of communism. Depending on
their level of “devotion,” Nixon parses “non-believers” from “believers,” and splits believers into
“old believers” and “new converts.” The true believer follows “orthodox” “doctrine,” even the
economic “dogma” “preach[ed]” by their “high priest.” But if a member of the proletariat doubts
the false prophecies of the founders or attempts to hold the priests (the dictators of the
proletariat) to their own “consecrated phrase” – promising to “wither away” – then those
doubters are accused of “heresy” and victimized to preserve unity within the communist faith.
Throughout this discussion Nixon either divides the USA from the USSR, or divides the Soviet
system into what they say (belief) and what they do (action). Nixon argues, through religious
terms, that the communist theory does not frequently match the practices of Soviet policy.
Although the Soviets have had some success (in the space program for example), Nixon sees an
irreparable contradiction at the heart of their system, and makes his own prophecy: short-term
political success, but long-term destruction due to their negative founding philosophies (Para.
85).
Overall, avoiding explicit conspiracy rhetoric and referring to communism through
religious terminology is effective. First, this maneuver from the puritanical frame includes lesshortatory conspiracy rhetoric and more presidential-sounding religious rhetoric. Although, Nixon
continually uses terministic binaries to describe the USA and USSR, his deft substitution of
religious vocabulary for conspiracistic terms avoids fear mongering and explicitly dichotomous
fear appeals in the paranoid style. His terms divide us from them, and divide and weaken the
Soviets internally but without a clear call to action, it is difficult to categorize Nixon’s fear
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appeals as wholly dichotomous. The liberal pluralist frame and didactic tone of the overall
speech restrains civic fear and refrains from the warnings and appeals to prudence which civic
republicans use to inspire courageous action. Therefore using puritanical terms within a mostly
liberal-pluralist ideology allows Nixon to use a more didactic tone and avoid dichotomous fear
appeals. Overall, the effect of substituting religious terms for terms derived from “to conspire” is
that Nixon can still denounce the communist conspiracy, while rarely having to name it as such.
Thus Nixon is pragmatic in his ideology, fear appeals, and terminology, before even considering
the inner-textual evaluative criteria.
The two criteria from the political style are a non-perfected scapegoat and an overall
conductive argument. Nixon does not use a comic plot in this speech – briefly evidenced by his
plain statement that communism in USSR is a “comedy of errors that is unfortunately also a
tragedy” (Para. 67). This means that although Nixon finds the communist philosophy laughably
absurd, the fact that it overtook Russia and now oppresses the Russian people is a tragedy. In
articulating these mixed sentiments, Nixon avoids a uniform plot.
The text has neither a recent key cardinal function regarding communism nor the Soviet
Union. Regarding the former, Nixon argues communism has been twisted since Marx and Engels
wrote the Manifesto in 1848 (Para. 22). Regarding the latter, Nixon claims that Russians have a
penchant for tyranny that even predates the Soviet Union – “an explanation for this condition [is]
in Russian history with its bloody and irregular successions of czars” (Para. 50). Neither of these
accounts of the conspiracy’s origins is recent.
The first clear criterion of the political style in the text is the non-perfected scapegoat.
This may result from the text’s didactic nature, but Nixon hesitates to perfect either the ideology
of communism or the Soviet Union as conspiratorial scapegoat – even when he is on the doorstep
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of perfection. By example, Nixon first calls communism not only “The major problem
confronting… the [US],” but also “free people everywhere.” Nixon then changes gears, writing
“this struggle probably will not be decided in the military…. The battle in which we are engaged
is primarily one of ideas” (Para. 6). Here Nixon eschews mention of the “militant aggressiveness
of international communism” (Para. 1), and chalks it up to what is “probably” just a clash of
faiths. This language of uncertainty is a caveat that de-escalates Nixon’s prior, harsher
characterizations of communism. Then after another harsh paragraph criticizing the “weaknesses
of communism as a system” (Para. 9), Nixon adds an odd paragraph that addresses the strengths
and accomplishments of communism in education and science (Para. 10). This pragmatic gesture
is strategic, though, placating readers who know “the curious fact that the literature of
communism contains so many praises for the achievements of capitalism” (Para. 21).
The rest of the text is mostly comprised of exhaustive discussions on the economic, legal,
and historical philosophies of the communist faith. Throughout, Nixon teeters on the brink of
perfecting their faith as scapegoat, even listing failed communist “prophecies” and the moribund
proclamation that “the communist brain will inflict serious damage on itself by the tortured
rationalizations with which it has to explain each successive bad guess” (Para. 65). But when the
reader thinks communism is beyond reclamation, Nixon again retraces his invective – conceding
the “achievements of Russian technology.” The catch however, is that “none of the solid
accomplishments of modern Russia came about by methods remotely resembling anything
anticipated by Marx, Engels, or Lenin” (Para. 78), and instead were brought about when
communism made capitalistic concessions in the market – what Nixon twice calls the “gray
market.” Because the Soviets are internally divided between Marxist fanatics and the many
“intelligent” citizens who pragmatically veer from Marxist devotion, “the fringe of serious

80

thought represented by active communist belief has become abraded to the point of near
extinction” (Para. 67). Therefore, for Nixon, the abraded ideology and the divided polity of
Russia are non-perfected scapegoats in the communist conspiracy.
The second clear political-style criterion in the text is the overall conductive
argumentative structure. The argumentative structure revolves around three explicit philosophies
laid out in the preview: “I want to discuss communism as an idea – its economic philosophy, its
philosophy of law and politics, its philosophy of history” (Para. 11). To this I would add the
implicit inclusion of communism’s moral philosophy in the text. The text, however, does not
cover each philosophy in a linear order, and they do not deductively lead to one unifying claim
or inductively build a comprehensive conclusion from these parts. Instead, the text intertwines
sections of argumentation on each topic, then covers and recovers those same topics with added
nuance. Together, Nixon argues that through these intermingled philosophies, “communism has
appeared as a kind of nightmare” (Para. 77). Here Nixon could have conclusively said
communism is the nightmare to Americans, or the biggest among a few nightmares – but he did
not. Nixon conductively leaves communism as just a kind, that moreover, is “shot through and
through with absurdities” (Ibid). Without a clear call to action in the speech’s peroration, the
audience is left to make sense of how this loose argument against the philosophies of
communism affects them, and the intuitive auditors may well make a conclusive leap about the
need to continually educate themselves and guard themselves and America at large against the
wiles of communistic absurdities. This conclusion is not explicit, though.
Considering elements of the paranoid style in the text, two are clearly present – pedantry
and circular arguments. As previously stated, a scapegoat is not perfected in this speech, and
neither is communism constructed as an, all-powerful, all-encompassing cabal. Instead Nixon
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argues communism is internally divided and weakening in the Soviet Union. Nixon is not trying
to incite another Red Scare, instead he is trying to reinforce American’s disdain for communism
through education, and the possible bi-product may be that poor and “vulnerable” countries, such
as Cuba, may be empowered through this knowledge, and eschew communism’s siren song.
The first clear element of paranoia in Nixon’s conspiracism can be seen in the text’s
circular arguments. As Nixon’s texts lengthen and progress in style from the “Maiden Speech” to
“The Meaning of Communism,” the number of fallacies also has increased – including circular
logic (which is not mutually exclusive to conductive argumentation, especially in a lengthy,
complex and pragmatic text). The first circular argument is Nixon claim that communism is no
longer a major threat to America since we abhor it so much. If abhorrence slides into ignorance,
however, than we again are vulnerable to an alluring communist philosophy. “We cannot be
content with simply an intuition that communism is wrong” (Para. 7). This line of argument
allows Nixon to claim that blind hatred is insufficient, since the blind could be misled or
proselytized by another belief – blind faith in communism. In sum, ignorant Americans may be
wooed by communism, but intelligent Russians will be wooed by the freedom of capitalism.
The other significant circular argument in the text deals with the concept of compromise.
Here Nixon puts the Soviets in a tight double bind, claiming that when they stick to Marxist
ideals and theory they are fanatics, but when they compromise and temporarily introduce
capitalistic market principles, they are weak and hypocritical (Para. 36). Thus, communism is
bad because it is unlike capitalism, but if it makes an “embarrassing concession” (Para. 37) to
capitalism it is worse because the system is then wracked with duplicity. The assumption is that
Marxist theory is inherently negative, thus all Soviet policy guided by that theory is
unredeemable.
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The second definitive element of paranoia in this text is Nixon’s pedantic discussion of
communist ideology and Soviet policy. In a pamphlet titled “The Meaning of Communism to
Americans” one should explain the meaning of communism; however, writing twenty-four
detailed pages on an ideology’s historical, legal and economic philosophies, and enumerating
corresponding Soviet policies, is excessive in the campaign-pamphlet genre. This pedantic
discussion of communist philosophy and Soviet policy starts on page two and ends on page
seventeen of the pamphlet (Para.s 7-84). In this section Nixon walks the reader through Marx
and Engel’s theory. First Nixon outlines their stages of history, progressing from feudalism to
capitalism and communism (Para. 17). Accompanying each stage Nixon mentions the
corresponding dominant class – aristocracy, bourgeoisie, and proletariat, respectively. Nixon
then quotes more than a paragraph of the “Manifesto” (Para. 22) before becoming embroiled in
the Soviet economy. Here Nixon delving into the excruciating economic minutia of wages,
inflation, taxes, supply and demand, principle, market forces, cronyism, etc. All the while Nixon
contrasts their system to the benefits of capitalism, such as, “Managerial efficiency promoted by
substantial economic incentives in the form of bonuses” (Para. 28). Many passages like this
exemplify pedantry indicative of the paranoid style.
Nixon then sets up a binary between constitutional democracy and tyranny, which shapes
the rest of the text. Regarding law, ours is a “check on power” that ensures rights; their law is an
“expression of power” that becomes all pervasive (Para. 54). Although our voting age (21) may
be higher than theirs (18), they can only vote for one party (Para.s 47-9). Shifting from law to the
false prophecies of Marx and Engels, Nixon outlines the “tacit and explicit” prophecies that he
believed were proven false (Para.s 63-5). This segues into the “brutalities and absurdities” of
communism, a faith full of “fictions and contractions” (Para.s 66-74). Significantly, Nixon here
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lays out the “three ingredients” for the communist faith: 1. organize the masses into a “faceless
army;” 2. direct them down the path of progressive history toward communism; 3. juxtapose
these believers against non-believing scapegoats to preserve a unity described by Nixon as a
“double identification” – “History belongs to the proletariat, the proletariat belongs to history”
(all quotes, Para. 74). This is theory, though, and in a pointed fashion, Nixon ends with the
brutalities of Russian leadership, exemplified in the power struggle for the office of Premier after
Lenin’s death. Nixon alludes to that battle between Trotsky and Stalin, emphasizes that Stalin is
a tyrant, and concluding with a quote from Aristotle that would haunt Nixon’s own presidency:
“we do not permit a man to rule, but the principle of law, because a man rules in his own interest,
and becomes a tyrant” (Para. 87). The presence of tyrannical rule is self-serving in Nixon’s
argument: the Soviets lack law, because its founders outlined non-legal philosophy. Furthermore
without law, there can be no morality for Nixon, thus communism is immoral. He ends the
pedantic text with this roundabout, possibly circular argument – his two paranoid criteria at
once.
Overall, in this campaign pamphlet a middle-career Nixon pragmatically employs
elements of the two conspiracy styles equally. At times, the movement between styles in this
second text is perplexing, especially when Nixon avoids seemingly obvious rhetorical moves:
stopping short of constructing an all-encompassing cabal, taking a position between tragic and
comic plotting, dividing without using dichotomous fear appeals, and blending three macroideologies (liberal pluralism, civic republicanism, and Puritanism). Moreover it is practically
befuddling when Nixon mentioned the “strengths” of communism that tempt converts. But only
one year removed from his trip to USSR and forging mutual-respect with Khrushchev in the
“Kitchen Debate,” Nixon’s begrudging praise of some communist “strengths” is strategic.
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Although he does not mention Khrushchev by name, Nixon clearly alludes to him, writing, “It
must not be forgotten that modern Russia was for an indefinite period prior to 1953 governed by
a tyranny” (Para. 87). Mentioning the year Khrushchev came to power as the year tyranny ended
in the Soviet Union positions Nixon, if elected, to continue the diplomatic relations that began
with the “Kitchen Debate.” Thus, not only is conceding one or two accomplishments to
communism a reasonable strategy for a presidential campaign and this logos-centric pamphlet,
but restrained praise of both the Premier and a few of his country’s accomplishments may be a
harbinger that Nixon already wanted his legacy issue to be detente with the USSR – which he
eventually achieved with Brezhnev in 1972.
Therefore, Nixon is pragmatic on multiple levels: 1. using two criteria from both
conspiracy styles, 2. looking for the “cash value” of communist theory so as to understand it and
teach it to the people, and 3. moving between texts, Nixon has gone from predominantly
paranoid in the first text’s conspiracy rhetoric to being equally political in this second text – if
only the evaluative criteria are considered. Considering his melded ideology and the absence of
dichotomous fear appeals, I argue the balance tips slightly to favor the political style in “The
Meaning of Communism to Americans.”
“The Hiss Case” (from Six Crises, 1962)
In the third and final text, Richard Nixon’s conspiracism is its most pragmatic. In this
book chapter, “The Hiss Case,” Nixon reminisces about the case that brought him national fame,
prosecuting the high-profile American communist, Alger Hiss. This case, in the summer and fall
of 1948, came about a year and a half after “The Maiden Speech” and Gerhart Eisler. But by the
time Nixon’s memoir was published, he had been off the HUAC committee for over a decade:
first as Senator for two years, then Vice President for eight years, and at the time of publication,
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out of politics following losses for President in 1960 and Governor of California in 1962.
Therefore, Nixon writes to rehabilitate his national profile and position himself for future
political office. To do so he writes about his greatest political hits and the first of his Six Crises
was prosecuting Alger Hiss.
Time had not softened Nixon’s memory of Hiss, though. The veracity with which Nixon
denounces the communist conspiracy, and Hiss as a conspirator, had not faded in the ensuing
fourteen years – as evidenced in the tone and pedantic recounting throughout the seventy-onepage chapter titled “The Hiss Case.” My focus within this lengthy text is the last eleven pages, in
which Nixon uses words derived from “to conspire” six times (pp. 61-71). In these pages Nixon
reverts to styling Hiss and communism in the paranoid style (similar to text one). Nixon, though,
after years of dealing with communism, is finally fully-paranoid, and constructs the conspiracy
in all four evaluative criteria indicative of the paranoid style. In doing so, Nixon attempts to
defiantly recount the Hiss case, supersede those who have continued to portend Hiss was a
victim, and vindicate his antecedent political success – which had often been criticized as fame
obtained leading a Hiss witch-hunt.
Fascinatingly, just as Nixon buries the communist conspiracy in a paranoid grave, the
political style arrests the pragmatist. While pedantically perfecting an all-powerful communist
scapegoat, Nixon simultaneously introduces a new “liberalist” conspiracy fully in the political
style – with all four political-style criteria attributed to this new conspiracy. Nixon uses this new
conspiracy to vindicate himself from the lingering critique of “red herring” heaped on the Hiss
investigation by none other than Democratic President Harry Truman. Speaking against a former
President is a major constraint, which Nixon fit by using the political style to construct Truman
as a mistaken, non-perfected scapegoat. The detailed analysis and discussion below examines
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why a pragmatic conspiracist may place these paranoid and political conspiracies side by side
within this third text.
Communist Conspiracy: Paranoid Style
Considering Nixon’s paranoid conspiracism, the entire chapter clearly perfects Hiss as
scapegoat – the first evaluative criteria. After naming each member of Hiss’ spy ring and their
important positions in either government or industry, Nixon concludes that Hiss and his gang
were not ordinary spies. “Some, like Hiss, reached positions so high in government that they
could influence policy directly” (p. 63). Nixon believes the (alleged) affected American policy
aligning it with the Soviets. Therefore, looking back, Nixon writes that he is very pleased to have
had the honor of being part of a case that resulted in “a guilty man [being] sent to prison who
otherwise would have remained free” (p. 70). Hindsight and the fact that a jury convicted Hiss of
perjury in 1949 build Nixon’s ethos on this point – hence the full-perfection of Hiss as
scapegoat.
Although he offers little proof on this point, Nixon alleges Hiss was maliciously spying
for, and in cahoots with, the Kremlin. The reader is reminded of the Pumpkin Papers (p. 67), and
that this evidence proved Hiss stole at least seventy classified documents from the US
government. But even more than this material treason, what disturbs Nixon is why Hiss worked
as a communist conspirator. Nixon checks off all the “typical” reasons for someone to become a
traitorous spy: bribery, power, psychological trauma, being duped or “led astray by his wife” (p.
66). These reasons may not be excusable, but they are conscionable to Nixon. But none of these
were the reason behind Hiss’ espionage. According to Nixon, “[Hiss] joined the Communist
Party… because he deeply believed in Communist theory… principles, and [their] ‘vision’ of the
ideal society still to come” (pp. 66-7). Compared to bribes or power, Nixon sees belief in the
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absurd communist faith as unforgiveable. Fleshly temptations snare the weak, but a deeper belief
in communism is totally depraved: “Hiss followed his beliefs deliberately and consciously to the
utmost logical extreme” – becoming a spy (p. 67).
The second paranoid criterion is Nixon’s depiction of an all-encompassing communist
cabal. In the two previous texts Nixon refrained from making the international communist
conspiracy a real domestic threat, but not now. Out of public office, Nixon finally attributes an
all-pervasiveness nature to the cabal. The aim of this rhetorical move may be to incite fear in
Nixon’s audience, and a desire for a strong leader who has a track record of ardent anticommunism. Unlike the first two texts, Nixon does not claim America is a final bastion of
freedom, or a safe haven. Instead he equates American communism “part and parcel” (p. 65)
with the communist international. “The Hiss case, for the first time, forcibly demonstrated to the
American people that domestic Communism was a real and present danger to [national] security”
(p. 62). Moreover, the Hiss spy ring was not weak and alone; the threat of “Communism in the
United States is multiplied a thousandfold because of its direct connection with… the world
Communist conspiracy centered in Moscow” (p.65 – emphasis mine). To further emphasize this
fearful linkage, Nixon repeats the phrase “Communist conspiracy at home and abroad,” (p. 69,
71 – emphasis mine), twice at the end of the chapter, including the final line. These terms reify
Nixon’s previous speculation about the growth of the communist cabal, first internationally and
now domestically. Reflecting on the Hiss case over a decade later, Nixon thinks the threat did not
go away with Hiss’ conviction or the dissipation of Hoover’s Red Hunt and McCarthyism.
Instead, Nixon warns, in perhaps his most paranoid moment, “that most dangerous period of a
crisis, [is] after the battle is over” (p. 69). This gives Nixon license to be perpetually on guard,
wary of the “invisible” manifestations of conspiracy that could be anywhere (p. 65). Nixon now
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depicts communism as a “chimera” (p. 68);221 a grotesque and fantastical monster.222 Thus
constructed, communism is an apocalyptic union of two paranoid criteria: an all-encompassing
cabal, and a fully-perfected scapegoat.
The third paranoid element in this text is the presence of circular arguments. The most
obvious circular argument in the text is Nixon’s denunciation of both the “radical right” and the
“radical left” (pp. 65-6). Positioning himself as mainstream, Nixon uses this “radical” binary to
observe the left baldly denies the existence and “danger of Communism at home,” even after the
Hiss conviction. This denial of clear evidence by the left forces the radical right to be
reactionary, and search for more communists to expose. When leftists cry foul regarding civil
rights and liberties, it refuels indignation among hardline conservatives convinced of the
presence of espionage (think McCarthy) and the left’s willful blindness to it. The right then uses
any means to justify its ends. Soon, Nixon argues, radical left and right turn on each other with
charges of conservative “red-baiting” and labeling liberals as “pink.”
The fourth, and last, paranoid element in the text is Nixon’s pedantry. Throughout the
chapter Nixon repeats the details of the Hiss case in minute detail. Not only does Nixon give a
specific timeline of events (testimony before committee, sub-committee, grand jury and trials)
and the corresponding press coverage, but Nixon details the uncovering of each key piece of
evidence (the apartment, rug, car, typewriter, pumpkin papers, and even a “prothonotary
warbler”), the struggle with the Truman Administration and Justice Department, and recounts
verbatim large portions of transcript from all hearings with Whitaker Chambers, Alger Hiss, and
The origin of the word “chimera” is Greek for “she-goat.” The most common depiction of this farcical,
fire-breathing monster is that of a creature with a lion head and body, a goat head emerging from the
middle of the creature’s back, and a serpent’s tail – the tip of the tail is the snakehead. Thus the creature
has three heads.
222
Webster’s New World College Dictionary, 4th edition, Foster City, CA: IDG Books Worldwide, Inc.,
2001, 255.
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Mrs. Hiss. Nixon ends with a recap of the two trials and eventual conviction of Hiss, and a coda
stating each principles’ personal outcome – including length of prison sentences and the current
occupations for Chambers and Hiss. In Nixon’s fashion, and in the paranoid style, it is a long,
pedantic retelling, never passing up an opportunity to display Nixon’s vigilant meticulousness.

Liberalist Conspiracy: Political Style
Even as he lays the anti-communist conspiracy to rest, Nixon turns his attention to an
alleged “liberalist” conspiracy. This maneuver allows Nixon to still play the victim, even after
the communist threat has been perfectly scapegoated in Hiss. Attributing the conceptual term to
political journalist Eric Sevareid (p. 67), Nixon strategically uses “liberalist” to disassociate
himself (a “classic liberal”) from the Democratic demagogues who criticized his conduct in the
Hiss hearings. Similar to his substitution of religious terms in the second text, Nixon
pragmatically understands it is best to avoid the use of conspiracy vocabulary implicating
mainstream, American, political figures. Truman is the case in point. Whenever Nixon comes
close to associating Truman too closely with conspiracy, or liberals with communists, Nixon
balks, and instead says “liberalist.”
The first criterion of the political style is the recent key cardinal function of the liberalist
junta. Nixon claims the origin of liberalists protecting communists only dates back to 1939 –
when Whitaker Chambers first accused Hiss of being a spy (p. 63). The fact that the Justice
Department made no enquiry into Chamber’s allegations at that time, or the “several times
thereafter,” proves to Nixon that FDR’s New Deal and Truman’s Square Deal were tinted pink.
Fortunately Nixon and HUAC opened a full investigation of Chamber’s charges in 1948,
preventing further infiltration of communists into governmental positions. Although Nixon
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interprets these circumstances as the willful protection of communists by liberalists, the key
cardinal function of this conspiracy was recent, and thanks to Nixon, righted within a decade.
The second criterion of the political style is Nixon’s non-perfecting of Truman as
scapegoat. Truman’s duplicity on the matter of communism confounded Nixon at first. This is
due to the fact that “No one would question the tough-minded anti-communism of the man who
had so boldly initiated the… Marshall Plan” (p. 64). But nevertheless, Nixon saw Truman as the
leader of the general “pooh-pooh[ing]” of the Hiss case by “the press and intellectual
community” (p. 69) through Truman’s numerous references to the investigation as a “red
herring.” Nixon eventually attributes Truman’s “unusual conduct” (p. 64) to the influence of his
1948 re-election campaign, because such “blindness” (p. 63) to clear facts, and “stubbornness”
(p. 64), could have no other explanation for Nixon. Instead of heeding new evidence in a nonpartisan manner, Truman pandered to his “liberalist” base and downplayed the threat of domestic
communism. Playing politics may have been negligent, but it was not a sinister-enough motive
for Nixon to perfect a former President as scapegoat. After all, Nixon was familiar with the brand
of pragmatism that places gamesmanship and political self-interest ahead of consistency.
Nixon’s gamesmanship segues into this text’s comic plot, its third political-style, antiliberalist rhetorical element. First Nixon writes Truman “inherited” the Hiss-case cover-up from
the FDR years (1939). Furthermore, Nixon does not fault the incoming Truman Administration
for following “an outworn political rule of thumb: leave the political skeletons hidden in the
closet with the door locked” (p. 64). When Chambers, HUAC, and Nixon unlocked that door and
produced evidence against a former State Department official, however, the liberalist plot shifted
from “laxity” to “negligence” (p. 63). Being misled by “blindness” and “stubbornness,” though,
is still a far cry from the traitorous evil Nixon attributed to Hiss and the paranoid communist
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conspiracy. Therefore, Nixon casts Truman as a non-perfected scapegoat character in a recent,
and comic, liberalist plot to refrain from investigating Chamber’s allegations that communists
were in the government.
Lastly, Nixon uses two conductive arguments in this text – one minor, one major. The
minor conductive argument loosely associates Nixon and Chambers. Using the passive voice in
his grammatical construction, Nixon writes two sentences in this text – one in the first full
paragraph and one in the last – in which the reader actually does not know the antecedent of the
sentences. Is Nixon referring to Chambers or himself? The first sentence is a précis of the Hiss
case quoted from Chamber’s book Witness: “Here, ‘the two irreconcilable faiths of our time,
Communism and Freedom, came to grips in the persons of two conscious and resolute men’.”
The ill-cited passage and its odd placement in the paragraph make it difficult to diagram the
subject of the sentence. The reader knows the man representing the faith of communism is Hiss,
but does Chambers or Nixon represent the faith of freedom? Being unclear in Chamber’s original
book, Nixon’s quotation makes the double-voiced claim doubly confusing as to who really
represents the faith of freedom. In the second quote, Nixon writes in a long last sentence:
“through that case, a guilty man was sent to prison who otherwise would have remained free; a
truthful man was vindicated who otherwise would have been condemned a liar” (p. 71). The
guilty man is Hiss, but this quote is even less clear in specifying whether the truthful/vindicated
man is Chambers or Nixon. Another option open to the reader’s interpretation is that Nixon is
conductively attributing these qualities to both Chambers and himself.
The second, more important, conductive argument is Nixon’s dual-construction of both
communist and liberalist conspiracies within the text. As I have shown in this analysis, the
speech creates a communist conspiracy in the paranoid style, replete with all four criteria. Next
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to that, without saying the word “conspiracy,” Nixon creates the “liberalist” in the political style
of conspiracy, including all four of its criteria. Deftly, Nixon never claims the two are “coconspirators;” instead, he relies merely on the spatial placement of the two side-by-side. Placed
in that way, they enter the readers mind side-by-side. Then, similar to cerebral hemispheres, their
contact allows a conductive transmission, in which the conspiracistic qualities of the perfected
communist jump the synapses, conducting a charge into the second, “liberalist,” hemisphere.
This process is the macro conductive structure of the speech, but can be seen in micro when
Nixon recalls the “prevailing opinion in the country… was probably that the Communists were
nothing but a handful of noisy but relatively harmless left-wingers” (p. 62). Nixon here conflates
left-wingers/liberalists with communism in one sentence, without writing, verbatim, “liberalists
are communists.” Especially those in the media, universities, and the bureaucracy are
“vulnerable” to the communist appeal (p. 67). These groups of liberalists happen to be the people
Nixon would later rail against in the transcripts of his secret oval-office tapes.223 Only then, the
“liberalists” had become Nixon’s perfected scapegoats in a tragic plot against his presidency.
Like Hofstadter’s theory of a paranoid leader, it seems Nixon imbibed an increasingly personal
view of history in his late career. Future scholarship may study if in fact conspiracy was the only
thing conducted from the communist to the liberalist. Or does this text, and its conduction, also
mark the beginning of what would become a complete transmission of Nixon’s paranoia from
communist to liberalist scapegoat?
To conclude the third text, and my analysis chapter, a word about ideological framing and
fear appeals is in order. Even though Nixon uses the paranoid style in this text’s anticommunism, I argue he uses the civic republican frame overall. Whether warning about
Kenneth Hughes, Jr., “Nixon vs. the Imaginary ‘Jewish Cabal’,” History News Network, 2007.
Accessed online at hnn.us/articles/42970.html, 2012.
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improved screening for federal employees to prevent future espionage (p. 63) or encouraging
readers to use the principle of freedom as a “method to fight communism” (p. 65), Nixon
continually warns citizens to be vigilant in guarding the fragile state.
Where civic republicanism and civic fear appeals have worked in tandem previously,
however, this text diverges. In his construction of a liberalist conspiracy in the political style,
Nixon divides the populous. Furthermore, in creating conductive categories of Hiss/communist
and Truman/liberalist, Nixon creates associative binaries. Since these two types of conspirators
and two styles of conspiracies are in cahoots, Nixon claims the co-mingling strengthens the
movement of the chimera into “every part of the world” (p. 62). Exposing this “decay of the
philosophy called ‘liberalism’” into a “heresy called Communism” (p. 62) inspires dichotomous
fear, which paralyzes the reader. Therefore, in addition to constructing two conspiracies in
different styles, Nixon goes one pragmatic step further, and crosses ideological framing in the
political style with dichotomous fear appeals in the paranoid style.
Analysis Recap.
Through my analysis of these three texts, I have described Nixon’s long-term strategic
use of pragmatic conspiracy rhetoric. In his first text, the “Maiden Speech,” I find Nixon to be
mostly paranoid, using three paranoid evaluative criteria and only one from the political style.
Although Nixon uses some dichotomous fear, the preponderance of his fear appeals is civic,
within the civic republican frame, calling for courage and civic action.
In the second text, a pamphlet titled “The Meaning of Communism to Americans” from
Nixon’s 1960 Presidential campaign, I find two evaluative criteria from the political style and
two from the paranoid style. When the text’s liberal-pluralist ideological frame, absence of
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dichotomous fear appeals and clear call to action are considered, however, the text moves toward
the political end of the conspiracy spectrum.
In the third text, after his losses for President and Governor of California, Nixon finally
constructs the communist conspiracy in a fully-paranoid style, including all four paranoid
evaluative criteria. In this complex text, however, Nixon then starts to construct a new
conspiracy, the “liberalist,” wholly within the political style – including all four of its criteria.
Therefore within one text I find two complete conspiracies pragmatically being constructed in
two separate styles. If not pragmatic enough, Nixon does all this within the civic republican
frame while inspiring dichotomous fear. This mixing of framing and fear is a-typical, compared
to a more typical use of civic republicanism to inspire civic fear and appropriate action.
Therefore, across the span of the three texts, and even within individual texts, Nixon’s movement
between stylistic criteria, ideological framing, and fear appeals exemplifies his pragmatic
conspiracy rhetoric.

DISCUSSION:
In this study, I argue Richard Nixon’s conspiracy rhetoric falls outside the paranoidpolitical binary. At this stage of his career, Nixon is unlike the archetypical examples of paranoid
leaders in Burke and Hofstadter’s work – unlike the militant leader, Hitler, and the
uncompromising leader, McCarthy. Furthermore, Nixon’s rhetoric is also dissimilar from Pfau’s
archetypical example of a political conspiracist – Abraham Lincoln. Through rhetorical criticism
of three Nixon texts, my assessment has emerged: Nixon’s rhetoric pragmatically uses both
existing styles, and that is the primary reason he does not neatly fit the mold left by former
conspiracy rhetors in the scholarship.
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Nixon’s pragmatism, which was shaped by his upbringing, results in his strategic, selfserving rhetoric, and his correlative political ascendency. It seems that Nixon understood a core
conspiracist principle in his rhetorical attempts to gain or regain political fame: “audiences are
more easily inflamed against conspirators than against conspiracies.”224 In other words, a person
(communist) is more tangible than an idea, and easier for an audience to conceptualize, direct
blame at, and punish. As an unknown Representative, with a Democratic Administration in
power (Truman), Nixon was willing to inflame his audiences though hortatory conspiracy
rhetoric, look state-side, and perfect individuals as scapegoats (Eisler and Hiss). But when Nixon
became well-known and a member of the current Republican Administration (Eisenhower), he
attempted to sound reasonable/presidential, using non-hortatory rhetoric, with an international
focus, to create a non-perfected, abstract scapegoat (communism).
Thus, Nixon pragmatically understood, however intuitively, when to be aesthetically
sensitive, and when to be stylistically anesthetized. This understanding led to his corresponding
use of more-paranoid or more-political conspiracy rhetoric depending on the situation. I argue
this knowledge of, and adherence to, “decorum in order to understand and act to advantage
within a social situation was… an essentially pragmatic approach.”225 This pragmatic approach,
through understanding and action, was the crux of Nixon’s conspiracy rhetoric and was likely
what made it effectively epitomized early Cold War style.
Overall, Nixon perceived rhetorical situations more deftly than his contemporaries. He
more quickly perceived political exigencies, better adapted (pragmatically) to situational
constraints, and styled his political rhetoric to changing decorum more fittingly than other anticommunist conspiracists of his time. This may be evidenced by the fact that the era was
224
225
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infamously named for McCarthy, while Nixon, through another pragmatic response to the
political climate, read the tealeaves, tempered his anti-communism while under Eisenhower, and
ultimately left McCarthy holding the bag. Only after Nixon was out of politics and trying to
regain the limelight did he again discuss domestic communism, glorify his own role in “The Hiss
Case,” and refocus on hortatory rhetoric against a tangible conspirator. Therefore, throughout
Nixon’s first political ascendancy, his brand of politically-savvy pragmatism propelled him in
front of ever-growing audiences, where his adaptability and conspiracism gained a large political
following.
A few implications about conspiracy rhetoric within the field can be extrapolated from
this study. First, conspiracy is not only paranoid or political, it can also be pragmatic. In studying
a tricky rhetor, it is evident that pragmatism, the underlying philosophy of an agency-focus, was
the underlying philosophy that fueled Nixon’s rhetorical fluidity. Second, conspiracism is a form
of agency for a rhetor, and if it is “pragmatic conspiracism,” it is doubly agentic. This is because
if one used the phrases “pragmatic agency” (in Burkean terms) or “agentic conspiracism” (in
Zarefsky’s terms) both would be redundant, as a pragmatically-focused philosophy precedes
agency, and conspiracism is a type of agency. Furthermore, if one wrote “pragmatic
conspiracistic agency,” I argue it would be akin to writing “agency agency agency.” A third
implication of this study is that if a scholar is looking for a pragmatic conspiracist, he or she may
initially select a rhetor who imbibes an economic viewpoint of free-market capitalism. This is
because, as Burke reminds us, capitalists look for the “cash value” of an idea.226 Thus in
capitalistic rhetoric the speaker, their method, and the topic may all be pragmatic. Nixon, I argue,
is an ideal case study, since his upbringing, his issue of expertise (pro-capitalism/anticommunism), and the agency with which he denounced that issue (overlapping conspiracy
226
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styles) are all pragmatic. A possible example for further study on pragmatism may be Ron Paul,
and his pro-free market/anti-Federal Reserve rhetoric. A fourth implication of this study is that
conspiracist rhetoric not only can pragmatically contain both paranoid and political evaluative
criteria, but a tricky conspiracist can also use multiple ideological framings across speeches or
within a single speech. Although Nixon primarily used civic republican framing in the first and
third texts, he also employed a liberal pluralist frame when embodying the role of didactic expert
in the second text, and at least partially used a Puritanical frame as evidenced by his liberal use
of religious terminology. A fifth implication of this study regards fear. It seems that focusing on
a tangible scapegoat (conspirator) promotes dichotomous fear and a tendency toward paranoia.
Focusing on a vague conspiracy (like communism as a whole), on the other hand, allows the
pragmatist to use civic fear appeals and remain more consistently within the political style.
Finally, this study implies that a pragmatic rhetor such as Nixon varies his or her use of
rhetorical proofs. This is evidenced in the three primary texts of this study as Nixon
predominantly relies on pathos, then logos, and then ethos respectively.
Future scholarship may determine if events in Nixon’s presidency, such as Watergate and
his resignation, correlate to my findings on his antecedent rhetoric. My suspicion is that as the
placement of communist and liberalist side-by-side in the third text conductively transmitted
conspiracy from the former to the latter, likewise, as Nixon’s presidency grew more isolated, that
insulation caused another conductive transmission to the liberalist – this time a transmission of
paranoia.
Despite what future scholarship may find conducted from early to late Nixon, his early
conspiracism has been useful in re-investigating the different conspiracy styles, and bridging the
formerly distinct paranoid-political binary. Future scholarship may likely find other rhetors who
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do not fit that pre-existing binary, and like Nixon, move between the two styles, sampling from
the evaluative criteria of each. Another option is that a wholly new style(s) of conspiracy rhetoric
may emerge. If other rhetors are found to use pragmatism similarly to Nixon, it may be possible
that a distinct “pragmatic style” of conspiracy could emergence, whereas hallmarks may include
fluid ideological framing, a philosophical focus on agency, varied fear appeals, rhetoric centered
on the inherently-pragmatic issue of capitalism, alternating focus on conspirators and
conspiracies, and intermittent reliance on rhetorical proofs. For now, however, this study does
not posit a wholly new style of conspiracy. Rather I have shown that Richard Nixon’s rhetoric
can reconfigure the paradigm of conspiracy styles as his pragmatism allowed him to move
between and sample from the existing paranoid and political styles of conspiracy rhetoric.
Nixon’s pragmatic style adhered to various decora and crystallized his epoch. For his
time, Nixon’s style was collective – a “cultural expression of an aesthetic vibration: this
vibration may be harmonious or violently discordant… but collective style invokes a meaningful
resonance among disparate, even ‘contradictory,’ social interests.”227 In other words, I believe
this study’s epigraph228 is not just about Nixon’s musical abilities, but characterizes, however
coincidentally, his pragmatic style of conspiracy. “[Playing] the black and white notes together,”
in jazz makes a “blue note,” and styles that musical genre. Likewise, Nixon’s conspiracism
(playing the paranoid and political notes together) was an overlapping of styles, he uniquely used
to style his rhetoric and vivify his era – uniting Republican factions, fitting rhetorical situations,
and pragmatically guiding his rising political star.

Vivian, “Style, Rhetoric, and Postmodern Culture,” 230.
“If you want to make beautiful music, you must play the black and the white notes together,” Richard
M. Nixon.
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